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SOCIOLOGY: ITS DEFINITION AND ITS LIMITS.*

I VENTURE again to attempt the difficult, but the indispensable, task of defining Sociology, stating its purpose, its limits, and its relation to other sciences and other studies.

In doing this I can only express my meaning in the terms of the philosophy which for some forty years now I have sought to illustrate and to explain. As I shall have within a short compass to deal with a series of high generalisations which lie *inter apices* of philosophy, it will be impracticable to attempt to give reasoned grounds for each of these principles in turn—for any one of them would require an entire treatise to put on a basis of demonstration. I shall simply try to show you how I regard these dominant problems, and ask you to think it out for yourselves and to see how far they seem to offer a satisfactory solution.

Sociology is the science of the entire series of the fundamental laws which apply to social phenomena. This is only an amplification of the general name which at the opening of the *Review* in January, 1908, Professor Hobhouse very rightly gave to our study—"the Science of Society." And it coincides with the definition given by Sir Charles Tupper (*Sociol. Review*, i, 209) that "Sociology is the scientific study of the origin, development, structure, functions, and decay of the ideas and institutions of mankind in successive stages of society."

I do not dissent from this full sentence which is rather a *description* than a *definition*; but I think that some words in it are superfluous and some other words could be made more precise. I shall not criticise this or any other definition or description of Sociology; but I will seek to explain the scope of the definition that I gave at the opening.

I use the term *science* rather than "scientific study"—a term which is properly applied to any kind of specialist research, such as numismatics, palaeography, or radio-activity. Now the grand, historic, and cardinal term, *science*, should be reserved for the

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great fundamental divisions of our knowledge which serve as master keys to all study, and group all inquiry into a few manageable and co-ordinate categories. People are silly enough to talk of "the science of Heraldry"; newspapers write of "the science of aviation"; and there is the "Christian Science" of pretending to be quite well when you are very sick.

The objection to using the dominant classification of "science" for any kind of scientific study is, that it gives the same name to branches of knowledge which differ enormously in volume and in importance. Astronomy has been recognized as a typical science for some thousands of years. Spectrum analysis is an instrument, and one of many recent developments, of Astronomy. It is a branch of scientific study. But it turns classification into chaos if we call Astronomy and Spectrum analysis alike sciences. A science is a system of demonstration of a mass of kindred matter studied by analogous methods.

Taking this as a test, the true sciences will arrange themselves thus:—

1. Mathematics, with all its many branches and subdivisions, leading up to celestial Mechanics. This is the basis and type of science, inasmuch as the whole of its conclusions are (a) abstract, (b) exact, (c) demonstrable.
2. Astronomy, with all its instrumental and subordinate studies, based on Mathematics and leading up to Physics. This science is less abstract, less exact, less capable of perfect demonstration.
3. Physics—with a large number of subject studies—such as Barology, Electricity, Radio-activity—which are not, strictly speaking, distinct "sciences," inasmuch as their subject matter is kindred in all and their methods are analogous. They run into each other and help each other. Thermology is not differentiated from the study of radium and its powers, in the way it is differentiated from political economy. It is a branch of the science of Physics, as political economy is a branch of the science of Sociology.
4. Chemistry has been treated as a distinct science by Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Littré, George Lewes, and most of the thinkers of the last century. It may be that recent discoveries may lead the scientists of this century to group together Chemical and Physical phenomena, to subdivide either or both, or to entirely rearrange Physics and Chemistry. That need not concern us now.
5. When we pass to the organic world from the inorganic world—if the distinction between the two should ultimately permit as it has hitherto been assumed to do—there is the

Science of Life—Biology, with its broad distinction of vegetable and animal life, and its very numerous subdivisions into the scientific study of Form, of Function, and Psychology, and so forth.

Auguste Comte made Psychology a branch of Biology, but Herbert Spencer made it a special science between Biology and Sociology. I think the weight of philosophical authority is to accept in this matter Spencer's classification. Comte was perhaps biassed by finding the term *Psychologie* used in his time to denote a futile kind of metaphysical introspection. But perhaps future philosophy will find it necessary to constitute Psychology as a special sixth science, if only from the enormous accumulation of biologic and psychic observations that have been made since the age of Lamarck, Gall, Comte and Darwin.

6. Immediately after Psychology, and largely dependent on it, comes Sociology, as sixth or seventh science, with all its numerous special studies such as anthropology, archæology, politics, economics, civics and so forth.
7. Then comes the burning question of Ethics, which Professor Hobhouse and many other authorities have tried to co-ordinate with Sociology, without, I think, positively ranking it as a distinct science, either as preceding or as following Sociology. And in this rather undefined order Herbert Spencer has left it. My own view is that Comte was emphatically right in making Ethics the final dominant and distinct science, and I think that this is one of Comte's most important contributions to the subject. It is curious that Herbert Spencer, writing long years after Comte's death and the translation of his works, never could be persuaded to see that Comte made Ethics a separate and final science, and that he made seven, not six sciences in all.

I have carefully studied the criticisms of Herbert Spencer and others on Comte's Classification of the Sciences, in the order of their decreasing generality and their increasing complexity, and I hold that Littré, Mill, George Lewes, Dr. Lester Ward, Dr. Bridges and others have amply supported Comte's scheme which in practice was exactly followed by Herbert Spencer in his own great System of Philosophy. Whatever may be the usefulness for certain purposes of Herbert Spencer's classification, and of his distinction of abstract and concrete science, I hold that for general philosophy Comte's classification for abstract, not concrete, studies holds the field and is practically adequate.

Now the only point essential to my present purpose is that the Master Sciences are seven or, if Psychology be a distinct science, are eight. But the venerable, and almost sacred, name of "science" should be restricted to these eight groups, or at least to no more than nine or ten, if fresh divisions be inevitable.

Again, I hold that all these seven or eight pure sciences should be regarded, if not as strictly abstract, as consisting of the dominant generalisations, and not of special concrete applications. The master term Sociology should be limited to what Comte calls "the fundamental laws" of phenomena, and not to observations of specific, local, or temporary phenomena. Thus I decline to call geology or geography "a science." And I decline to treat criminal or vital statistics, notes on experiments in co-operation, socialism, or penal legislation as "sciences," on even special scientific studies. They are certainly not the science of Sociology nor are they even branches of Sociology. Sociology is divisible into very many kindred studies, and each of these studies may have very many incidental methods of inquiry. But it will be misleading to pursue these quite subsidiary inquiries apart from the rest, and without close regard to the fundamental laws of society. And I decline to dignify by the truly philosophical name of Sociology tabulated facts and even abnormal curiosities that concern petty groups of men and women who may be found in tribal or social union.

Sociology therefore is one of the master *sciences*—it may be one of seven or eight (or possibly nine or ten) and its minor subdivisions and instruments are properly defined as the *scientific studies* of such phenomena as anthropology, of social institutions, the philosophy of history, politics, economics, civics. Sociology, we say, has as its field the "entire field" of social states, social laws, and social evolution. That is to say, it is not principally concerned with mere embryos, rudimentary conditions, much less with "sports" and curiosities.

When we come to group what I call the entire field of social phenomena we are met by the profound division between permanent states, institutions, and conditions, and evolutionary movement, growth, and change. The great dividing line is that between Social Statics and Social Dynamics, first exactly formulated by Auguste Comte, and entirely adopted and illustrated by Herbert Spencer, Mill, and I think most positive sociologists. *Statics* of course include all the laws relating to family, tribe, nation, race, empire, property, accumulation, land, church, language, government, legislation. *Dynamics* include the laws relating to all forms of social development, prehistoric, and historic sequence of states, so far as they are really *laws* and not mere *hypotheses*.

Now of these two orders of laws—Statistical and Dynamical—the second are far the more extensive, the more complex, and the more

decisive. The constant elements in these statical forms of society have nothing like the range, diversity, and complication, which we find in the dynamical forms which social institutions assume in their almost infinite evolution. That is to say, that a far larger volume of inquiry and of thought is required fully to tabulate and explain the multiplicity of historical changes, than will be required to analyse the leading institutions and permanent conditions of human society. These dynamic laws far exceed in bulk, in abstruseness (almost we may say in mysteriousness) the statical laws by which, no doubt in one sense, they are controlled, and from which they certainly start. That is to say, the philosophy of history is far the largest and the dominant part of Sociology.

I return again to my initial definition that Sociology is the science of "fundamental laws" of society. I prefer that to the definition that it is "the scientific study of the origin and institutions" of society, because the business of a real master science is to systematise *laws*, not to tabulate mere observations, unexplained or co-ordinated. All science is the co-ordination of *laws*, and by laws we mean constant relations, uniformities, and sequences, that we have proved to be present in given phenomena, and that we can count on finding under the same conditions.

Again I qualify the term *laws* as being the fundamental, essential, typical laws, apart from infinite ramifications in which if law be present, as it certainly is, it lies under such infinitesimal degrees, and is so interlaced with subtle incalculable reactions, that it will long, perhaps ever, surpass the wit of man to disembody it. It would be a preposterous claim to ask of sociology that it should systematise the "entire series" of the laws of social phenomena. That would be a task to overwhelm omniscience. These laws are to man's intelligence quite infinite.

We may talk of sociology systematising the entire series of "fundamental laws" of society—if we mean first, the *Statics* of Society embracing a manageable set of the elemental institutions, and then the *Dynamics*, embracing the formative laws of history in sufficient detail to give in the abstract a general explanation of social development. But it must be understood that we should be wandering from our field of the *essential laws* if we attempted to explain in the *concrete* the subtle cross currents of specific events. It would be to parody the name of Sociology to undertake to unravel all the causes and all the effects of the recent general election. Sociology uses as an instrument a generalised philosophy of history. It cannot pretend to give a political *vade mecum* to enable candidates or parties to frame their calculations so as to win a majority of votes.

I have sometimes wondered how articulate persons who pose as public instructors can be found to make the shallow criticism that

there is no such science as Sociology at all and that it is a self-delusion to talk of laws of society. I should have thought that no one who had followed philosophical thought of the last 50 years—say since Herbert Spencer's masterly essay on "The Social Organism" of 1860, or his popular treatise on Sociology of 1873—or even that any one who had dipped into serious literature in periodicals for the last generation—could have failed to see that at least there may be—must be—will be—such a science as Sociology, a science far more complex, more noble, and infinitely more important to man than the Physical Science which the most illiterate sciolists acknowledge to be practical and real.

But it occurs to me that these stupid jibes against Sociology may be partly excused by the extravagant habit of some Sociologists who are wont to dignify with the name of science loose guesses about things debated in Parliament and even bare statistics or remarks that we read in the daily press. Politics, and observations of social facts, more or less abnormal, may be useful to know for the practical purposes of life. But they are not science, they are not Sociology, they are not branches of Sociology, and indeed unless with a laborious process of mental manufacture of smelting, baking, and fashioning, they are not even the raw material, the bricks or beams, out of which social laws could be ultimately framed. If the man-in-the street and the literary jester who amuses him mock at Sociology, it is because some Sociologists are pleased to give the name of science to their own talk about the topics of the day.

There is unfortunately far too much ground for this misunderstanding, for the very founder in England of Sociology himself in working out his scheme has made a cardinal and fatal aberration. I am the last man to undervalue Herbert Spencer, for I constantly hail him as our chief, I sometimes feel inclined to say our only, modern philosopher. But, as I have urged in several books of mine, and especially in my Herbert Spencer lecture at Oxford in 1905, we cannot find in Spencer even any sketch of general history, any dynamic laws of civilization at all, other than the mysterious all-explaining *Evolution*—which is little more than the statement that society does change and grows more and more heterogeneous. I will quote a passage from my Address:—"The Synthetic Philosophy of Evolution contains no history of human civilization in its entirety, as a continuous biography of man. There is not in it, and he never has even projected, any philosophy of general history, the dynamics in fact of Sociology. In his 'Principles of Sociology' there are a body of acute but miscellaneous observations, and some profound suggestions as to the origin of institutions, primitive habits, rudimentary groups. But we never get farther than glimpses of savage life, the variations in primæval

rites, and the survival of ancient customs. In all Spencer's vast output there is nothing that can be called any theory of general history. What we have is the embryology of society. But no science is constituted if its conclusions are limited to embryology."

This is no over-statement. Besides many essays often re-issued and his excellent volume on "The Study of Sociology," Spencer published in his *Synthetic Philosophy* three large volumes of "Sociology"—containing more than 2000 pages 8vo. I need not say that they are all full of luminous thoughts and most curious analogies—but in an enormous proportion, they treat of primitive societies and savage tribes. And the whole three volumes are devoted to the *Statics* of Society, institutions, primitive ideas, and social forms. The first volume opens rightly with the *Data*, and the *Inductions* of Sociology; and if these 800 pages had been compressed into one introductory chapter, it would have advanced his purpose.

The Part III. of Vol. I. goes on rightly to deal with *Domestic Relations* and the *Family*. But here we get little beyond the Fijians, Iroquois Indians, Dyaks, and Veddahs.

Volumes II. and III. are exclusively devoted to *Institutions*—Ceremonial, Political, Ecclesiastical, Professional, Industrial—and even in such very modern institutions as Co-operation and Socialism we have the irrepressible Bushmen of South Africa, Red Indians, and Australian savages brought up as examples. Now it is not that we have the evolution of institutions in these 134 chapters—but the larger part of all of them is devoted to primitive types, often to mere 'sports' or abnormal accidents, incalculable caprice, and curious survivals. From beginning to end of these three volumes there is no pretence of anything like a continuous scheme of social evolution—nothing that can be called a philosophy of history; and yet a scientific theory of general history is the larger and far the most important part of Sociology. Spencer never had a glimmering of history. He leaps from the Dyaks of Borneo to the nose-slashing duels of German students.

It is too true that on all sides and in all schools the search after origins, embryos, rudiments seems to be thrusting out the study of mature forms and still more study of the *laws* of growth. Biologists are so absorbed in hypothetical arboreal apes, hipparions and protoplasms, that they forget to tell us about the laws of contemporary life. Students of law hardly know how a will should be attested, but they are learned in the laws of Offa and Ina. Students of history blunder about the Act of Settlement and the growth of the Cabinet—but they will write long essays about the mark system of the early Germans. For myself I get utterly weary of the barbarous mutilations and nasty tricks of savages with which Spencer deluged Sociology out of the notes of his "Descriptive

Sociology." Ninety-nine out of every hundred of his references regale us with these squalid brutalities. We know now enough about the persistence of irrational customs in all races and in all ages. But I decline to regard the tattoo marks on a Fijian girl's back as a contribution to Sociology.

To bring my argument to a conclusion, let me repeat that real Sociology is the science of the *fundamental laws* of Society—that is, of the dominant tendencies which can be demonstrated to control the evolution of civilization. Not isolated, or even analogous, *facts*—but sequences, that is, a succession of similar results in a series of social phenomena. And again not incidental, subsidiary *facts*, nor even subsidiary *laws* (which for the most part are too subtle and complex to admit of scientific proof), but only of the dominant laws which can be traced through the five or six thousand years of historic record. The two parts of Sociology are—first—the types of the main Social Institutions (and these can hardly be carried beyond a dozen or so), secondly—the main tendencies which can be shown to be operative in the collective course of civilisation—and mainly in the most advanced portions of humanity.

Of course, neither statical nor dynamical laws of society can be formed without an immense body of observations both of human institutions in all their stages, and also of historical knowledge in all ages and in all races. But *facts* about social groups and social events—remaining as *facts* and not becoming theories, or laws, or explanation of colligated observations are not Sociology, nor even, if left bare so, are not the instruments, nor even the data of Sociology.

The science of Sociology will never command the respect and study of the trained public, if Sociologists claim their attention to things which can only be usefully discussed in the articles of a newspaper, or in a private member's Bill in Parliament—still less if their attention is claimed in the name of the chief of the sciences for queer inhumanities detected by a preacher amongst some unknown savages of the Southern Hemisphere. Sociology is the science of the fundamental laws of civilisation. It is not the naked statement of anything which ever has been observed among any group of human beings in any part of our globe. Things of this kind (and, it seems, the more abnormal the better) fill the Sociology of Spencer and many philosophers, whilst we do not find in them a word about the dominant phenomena of evolution—such as the origin and growth of Greek intellect, the rise and fall of the Empire of Rome, the history of the Catholic Church, the sources and phases of the Revolution in Europe.

FREDERIC HARRISON.

THE GENERAL ELECTION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION.*

It is impossible for me, perhaps for anyone else, to perform in a really satisfactory manner the task which I have undertaken to-night. If, as has been said, prophecy is the most gratuitous form of human error, interpretation of current politics may be conceded the second place. For the ideal interpreter is himself a contradiction in terms. Interpretation is impossible without a sympathetic understanding, and a sympathy directed with entire impartiality and, what is more, capable of convincing others of that impartiality, is not attainable. For what sort of a citizen would he be, who in the present current of public affairs, could guarantee to himself or to others this complete impartiality? An intelligent foreigner might indeed set forth the measurable facts of the subject without bias, but he could hardly give them the meaning and the valuation essential to the process of interpretation.

I shall not pretend the impossible. Though my treatment will be as 'sociological' as I can make it, the fact that I entertain certain political opinions implies, even in selection and ordering of material, still more in valuation and interpretation, a measure of bias for which each member of my audience must make his own allowance. I shall be content if I can keep this bias within bounds and fairly constant in direction and intensity. For then I shall afford to those who see events with different eyes the best conditions for making an intelligible adjustment for themselves.

In laying before you what appear to me to be the chief measurable facts disclosed by the result of the general election, I must ask you further to remember that time compels a very rigorous economy of selection. Much relevant and interesting matter must be omitted from our survey.

The election results must be considered in the first place as disclosing two facts: first, the present judgment of the electorate upon a set of issues forming the substance of two, or in some cases three, policies, and recommended by the prestige of party names and leaders; second, the change that has taken place in the electoral preference since the election of four years ago qualified by some eighty bye-elections. For our purpose it is best to pay most attention to analysis and interpretation of the present judgment; for, if we hold the electoral choice to be directed at least as much by

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consideration of policy as of party allegiance, we shall recognise that the shift of important issues since 1906 has been so considerable as to invalidate to an unknown extent an attempt to interpret the swing of the pendulum in any close relation to particular issues.

For obvious convenience I shall in most of my account omit Ireland, confining myself to the election in Great Britain. Some of the few figures I present will be merely approximate, partly because exact figures are not always attainable, partly because round figures are more easily comprehended and do no harm where no argument depends on their exactness.

Taking first the General Election as a Plebiscite, and counting Liberal and Labour votes together, as we are justified in doing from their close agreement on the dominant issues, we reach the following result for Great Britain:—

Liberal and Labour.	Unionist.	Majority.
3,185,250	2,904,001	281,249

a majority amounting to about $4\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. This plebiscite is of course very differently proportioned in relation to the different groups of constituencies. In London the Unionist majority amounted to about $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.: in the English boroughs the Liberal majority was about 4 per cent., in the English counties about $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. In Wales the Liberal vote was considerably more than double the Unionist vote (206,288 to 97,126): in Scotland the majority was nearly 20 per cent.

It will be evident from consideration of this result that, as usual, the numbers of members of the parties elected bear no just relation to the aggregate party vote.

If an equal value were secured for every vote, the majority for the Liberal and Labour parties in Great Britain would be, not 63, the actual number, but 27. The operation of our electoral machinery, as is well recognised, tends to favour the stronger party, giving it a majority in excess of its proportionate majority of votes. This excess, though considerable, is, however, far smaller than in most recent elections, as the following figures show:—

Vote Majorities.				
	1895	1900	1906	1910
Great Britain	U. 310,632 322,974	L. 636,418	L. 281,249
Maj. in Seats	U. 213	U. 195	L. 289	L. 63

In regarding the election as a measure of public opinion, it would, however, be necessary to exclude plural voting. This introduces a considerable element of conjecture into our arithmetic. The number of out-voters is not known. It is often roughly

estimated, upon what evidence I know not, at half a million, or about 1 in 13 of the votes cast. If this is even approximately true, it evidently makes a considerable readjustment necessary in estimating the election as a plebiscite. For no one will contend that these outvotes are equally apportioned between the two parties. In the recent election it is not unreasonable to believe that four out of five were cast for the Unionist party. This estimate is defended by urging that plural voting is virtually confined to men of property, the overwhelming majority of whom, especially in the South of England where outvoters chiefly dwell, vote conservative. If half a million of such votes were actually cast and four out of five went to a Unionist, this would be equivalent to a weighting of the Unionist poll by an additional 10 per cent. of votes. Or, putting the matter in another way, the abolition of the plural voting at this election would have doubled the actual majority of Liberal votes in Great Britain, raising the majority of Liberal and Labour members, under a system of one vote one value, to a figure a little below the 63 which is their actual majority.

It is now time to consider the geographical and economic distribution of political opinion as indicated by party victories in the election. First, we are confronted by that remarkable contrast of North and South which first strikes the eye on glancing at the electoral map. A line drawn across Great Britain along the Mersey and the Trent shows an overwhelming majority of Liberal and Labour seats in the northern section, an almost equally overwhelming majority of Unionist seats in the southern section, if Wales be left out of the account. This geographical generalisation, however, requires important qualifications. The uniformity of the Unionist South is broken by substantial patches of Liberalism in the industrial part of the Metropolis, in Cornwall and Devon, and in Norfolk and Lincolnshire. Upon the other hand Unionism makes two considerable encroachments upon the Liberal North, one along the sea-coast constituencies East and West, another in a slanting wedge working through Staffordshire and Cheshire towards a point in North Lancashire. The predominance of Unionism throughout the coast constituencies is very marked, amounting in the south to an almost complete possession. The general contrast of North and South is sharpened by the fact that the further North you go the greater the compactness and the uniformity of Liberalism, while Conservatism becomes correspondingly more intense the further South you go.

The list of party gains which marks most forcibly the change of political opinion since 1906 gives striking testimony to the same general truth, showing that the Liberalism of the North is virtually unmoved, during a period when the South has undergone a profound change. For, of the 117 seats gained by Unionists in

England, 13 only stand above the line of Trent and Mersey, while 9 Liberal and Labour gains above that line reduce the net Unionist gain in the Northern Counties to 4. In Scotland the net Unionist gain was none, five seats being won by them and five lost.

A truer electoral map, which indicated by a deepening of the representative colours the size or proportion of the majority by which each seat was held, would upon the whole enforce still further the contrast of North and South, showing proportionate Liberal majorities which grew larger as you went further North, Unionist majorities largest in the most Southern Counties. The special case of the Birmingham sphere of influence would, however, qualify the operation of this general rule.

Before turning to the interpretation of these broad results I ought to remind you that the proportion of the distribution of seats in North and South respectively gives of necessity a very exaggerated notion of the distribution of political opinion. So long as there is no provision for the proportionate representation of minorities this is inevitable. The effect is to induce a belief that the North is more Liberal, the South more Conservative than is actually the case. Even in Lancashire where the Liberals claim a signal victory it is asserted by the *National Review* that nearly 45 per cent. of the votes recorded were cast for Tariff Reform.

Now, taking this geographical distribution of parties as indicated by the electoral results, we can easily apply some general principles of economic criticism. North and South correspond with certain economic distinctions. The great productive industries of manufacture and of mining are almost entirely Northern, while the South is more agricultural, its manufactures are small and less highly organised, and it contains a large number of pleasure resorts and residential towns and villages.

The statement that industrial Britain is Liberal, rural and residential Britain Conservative, is substantially accurate. It may be tested variously. London itself may be cited as a witness. Indeed the geographical distribution of electoral results in the Metropolis is the most striking corroboration of the economic interpretation of the larger contrast between North and South. For in London, East and West correspond economically with the division of North and South in the country taken as a whole, and, as a glance at the map will show, the East is entirely Liberal, the West entirely Unionist, in each case with the one exception which saves the appearance of unnatural exactitude. But when we turn from London, whose industrial conditions are unique, to the great manufacturing towns of the Midlands and the North, we find an overwhelming preponderance of Liberal seats. Even the exceptions form the rule, for Birmingham, Liverpool, Wolverhampton, Nottingham, Preston, Sunderland, are all susceptible of easy

explanations based upon the special conditions of employment or of unemployment, or upon the chance of a three-cornered contest. Every other great industrial city in the country has returned a majority of Liberal members, or of Liberal votes, while the dominance of Liberalism north of the Tweed carried even the great residential capital of Scotland.

Where industrialism is most highly organised and most concentrated, upon the great coalfields of Lancashire and Yorkshire, Derbyshire, Northumberland and Durham, not to mention South Wales, the greatest intensity of Liberalism and Labourism prevails. The textile, machine-making and mining constituencies yielded almost universally the largest Liberal majorities, infecting with their views even most of the semi-agricultural constituencies in their near neighbourhood. The Liberal predominance in the North may be thus summarised. Scotland and North England, including Lancashire, Yorkshire, Durham, Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmorland, Derbyshire and Cheshire, send to Parliament 175 Liberal and Labour men and 54 Unionists. Hardly less concentrated is the Unionist power in the home and Southern counties. Kent, Surrey, Sussex, Hertfordshire and Huntingdon are held entire, while Middlesex and Warwickshire show only one Liberal seat. Almost every old cathedral city, with the exception of one or two important industrial centres such as Durham, York, and Norwich, nearly all the dockyard and service towns, the watering places and pleasure resorts, the county towns throughout the South, the old market towns, which return a member of bulk largely in some county constituency, cast substantial majorities for the Unionists.

Most instructive is the test of Unionist gains. With the exception of a few seats in Lancashire and Staffordshire and half a dozen of the London seats, the 117 Unionist gains in England were almost wholly composed of non-industrial towns and purely agricultural or residential county constituencies.

This tabulation will suffice to enable us to understand why the political issues set before the electorate produced such different results in North and South Britain. The three positive issues of prime importance were the Lords' Veto, the Land policy contained in or associated with the Budget, and Tariff Reform. Two other issues, though of inferior formal importance, namely, the liquor taxation and the German scare must, however, be accorded a prominent part in influencing votes, particularly in London and in the smaller older boroughs. To Home Rule, the Education Question and other older issues I do not assign wide influence in determining votes or the results of elections, except in a few special cases.

To attempt any assessment of the relative value of these issues

as influencing the result of elections is of course a very hazardous proceeding. The view stated here is only to be taken as a register of the impressions gathered from conversation with active politicians, some personal observation and copious reading of the press of both parties.

The solidarity of Liberalism in the North and generally in the great industrial centres may, I think, be regarded as an endorsement of an Anti-Veto policy, Land Reform and Free Trade, with a fairly equal valuation of the three issues. The Lords and the Land probably bulked more largely as the really live issues in Scotland and the Northern English counties, where Tariff Reform propaganda has made less progress. Though Liberal candidates and leading platform speakers all over the country placed the issue of the Lords in the front of their appeal, it did not play so considerable a part off the platform, and in the Midlands and South it was certainly a subordinate influence in determining elections. The Unionist victories in the South must be attributed chiefly to a successful propaganda of Tariff Reform, mainly directed to the issue of unemployment, assisted by the unpopularity of the liquor taxes and a half-military, half-industrial fear of Germany. There are, I am aware, many other factors which deserve attention. One deserves, I think, especial mention: the failure of the Government to secure the effective administration of the Small Holdings Act was an important contributory cause to the loss of Liberal seats in the rural South.

Assuming that this general assessment of electoral issues is substantially correct, it is worth while briefly to consider the methods by which they were made effective for influencing votes. Here of course we enter the shadowy, or shady, region of the arts of electioneering. How far, and in what sense, can the verdict of the electorate be regarded as a reasoned judgment, how far was it procured by strong subconscious or irrational suggestion, how far by the mere mechanics of electioneering, how far by intimidation or sheer bribery? No man can answer such questions with confidence or any safe precision. I will, however, venture the following opinions. The abnormal fierceness of a contest in which pocket-interests bulked more largely and more clearly than at any previous election, probably evoked a certain recrudescence of those practices of bribery, treating and intimidation, which, once general, have never died out of our electioneering. In certain constituencies where traditions of corruption and servility survive, and where the conditions of work enable pressure to be brought to bear upon numbers of poor electors in precarious employment, such malpractices may have affected the result. But, making due allowance for the tendency of the defeated party to exaggerate the amount of unfair play, where some unfairness exists, I am not disposed to

set down very much to the score of bribery or direct intimidation. No doubt 'moral influence,' to use a dubious phrase, which comprises respect for the known opinion of 'our betters' and a general desire to stand well with the gentry and those who can influence business or employment, counted more heavily than usual. But even then the line between such personal influence and the impersonal appeal of political issues is hard to draw. Personal or business interests everywhere help to drive home arguments or to give efficacy to emotional suggestions.

No student of electioneering is likely to underrate the part played by emotional suggestion. But it may easily be exaggerated. Even the familiar appeals to party allegiance are not merely emotional, still less merely subconscious; they contain some element of rational appeal. The figure of a Duke who asks you to 'get off his earth,' of a foreigner who has 'got your job,' or of a dissipated London corner-man who 'wants work,' are no doubt intended to impose rather than to educate opinion. But none the less they do serve to evoke reflection. Everywhere knots of men, gathering round these placards, were stimulated or provoked to reasoned controversy. I would venture to assert that there has never been an election in which reasoned discussion has been so widespread and played so large a part in determining results. Nor would I apply this only to the North, where by general consent the level of intelligence and intellectual interest among the working classes is higher than in the South.

The Tariff Reform victory in the South was obtained upon the whole by convincing the understanding of the active minds of the electorate. Although many of the facts adduced were false and most of the reasoning faulty, it was a serious attempt to present a reasoned fiscal policy, directed chiefly to prove that Protection could increase employment. Indeed the failure of Free Trade to find effective platform arguments to meet the contention entitles Protectionists fairly to claim an argumentative victory upon this head. Though political education of a formal sort has made little advance in any class, the magnitude and even the dramatic character of the new issues do much more than influence the passions; everywhere in various degrees they awaken reflection and stimulate the reasoning faculties. The result is that elections are coming gradually to depend less, not more, upon mere skill of electioneering: sound facts and right reasoning are gradually coming to possess an increased advantage over unsound facts and false reasoning. It is easier to impose true than false suggestions, for they are less likely to be 'found out' when every electorate comes to contain a leaven of intelligent and informed minds.

One other point connected with electioneering deserves mention. It is probably the case that in the South, where men of

property are more numerous and are more predominantly Conservative, the mere mechanics of electioneering was used with more effect than any sort of bribery or intimidation to secure Conservative majorities. The machinery of registration, the co-operation of 'the trade' and of other outside agencies, and, in particular, the services of the motor car, probably account to a considerable extent for the increase in the Unionist poll.

Having now disposed, however imperfectly, of the main external features of the general election, let us turn once more to investigate more closely the significance of the contrast between political opinion in the North and South, in industrial and non-industrial Britain. What is the difference in character or disposition of electors which induces the cathedral and residential cities of the well-to-do, the watering places, service towns and feudal ruralism to vote for Tariff Reform and the Lords, while the manufacturing and mining centres with the more independent agricultural population of the North declare for the Budget, Land Reform and the legislative liberty of the representative House? Before suggesting an answer to this question, it is, however, right to call attention to one interesting result of the election which appears to conflict with the economic generalisation presented here. I allude of course to what is known as the Birmingham area. In this part of the Midlands a large group of definitely industrial constituencies has severed itself from the rest of industrial Britain. This severance would itself form a valuable subject of sociological enquiry. How much weight should be assigned to the extraordinary personal prestige of Mr. Chamberlain, how much to efficient operation of the political machine first made in Birmingham, how much to the fact that a large number of the trades upon which this district is dependent, are carried on in small factories or workshops which do not favour effective Trade Unionism, and are engaged in making goods which are exposed to close foreign competition, to an unusual extent? I do not possess knowledge enabling me to answer these questions: it is, however, probable that each of the considerations I suggest contributes to the result, and perhaps further allowance should be made for obscure but strong influences of local pride in adhering to a policy which has evoked so much interest and so much criticism.

But the importance of this exceptional area is not such as to destroy the validity of the general distinction between industrial North and non-industrial South.

The two Englands, to which the electoral map gives substantially accurate expression, may be described as a Producer's England and a Consumer's England, one England in which the well-to-do classes, from their numbers, wealth, leisure and influence, mould the external character of the civilisation and determine

the habits, feelings and opinions of the people, the other England in which the structure and activities of large organised industries, carried on by great associated masses of artisans, factory hands and miners, are the dominating facts and forces. The Home Counties, the numerous seaside and other residential towns, the cathedral and university towns, and in general terms, the South, are full of well-to-do and leisured families, whose incomes, dissociated from any present exertion of their recipients, are derived from industries conducted in the North or in some over-sea country. A very large share, probably the major part, of the income spent by these well-to-do residential classes in the South, is drawn from possessions or investments of this nature. The expenditure of these incomes calls into existence and maintains large classes of professional men, producers and purveyors of luxuries, tradesmen, servants and retainers, who are more or less conscious of their dependence on the goodwill and patronage of persons 'living on their means.' This class of 'ostentatious leisure' and 'conspicuous waste' is subordinated in the North to earnest industry: in the South it directs a large proportion of the occupations, sets the social tone, imposes valuations and opinions. This England is primarily regarded by the dominant class as a place of residence and a playground, in which the socially reputable sports and functions (among which church-going, the theatre, art, and certain mild forms of literary culture are included), may be conducted with dignity and comfort. Most persons living in the South certainly have to work for a living, but much of this work is closely and even consciously directed by the will and the demands of the moneyed class, and the prestige of the latter imposes habits, ideas and feelings antagonistic alike to useful industry and to democracy. Moreover (a feature related closely to the character of the expenditure) the occupations of the people in the South are principally those of retail traders, small tenant farmers with ill-paid labourers, and numbers of small local businesses supplying the needs of local groups of consumers. The only great widespread industry, building, is in structure and working widely sundered from the great manufacturing and mining industries, and its instability affects gravely the character of its employees. In the South there is a great gulf fixed between the gentry and the working classes, a class of peculiarly servile shopkeepers furnishing no proper bridge. In the North a large proportion of the well-to-do are actively engaged in organising and directing industry, and, more important still, the industries support large classes of regular, well-paid, intelligent artisans and other skilled workers. Here we reach the chief clue to the difference of political opinion in North and South. The Liberalism and Labourism of the North is mainly dependent on the feelings and opinions of this upper grade of the wage-

earners, the large, new middle-class. The strength of Liberalism, as attested by the election, varies directly with the relative size and compactness of this artisan element. Almost everywhere is set against it the opinion and the vote of the great majority of the employing, the professional, the shopkeeping, the leisured classes upon the one hand, and a large proportion, usually a majority, of the casual or semi-employed manual labour, and of clerks and shop-assistants, upon the other.

Never has the cleavage been so evident before. It is organised labour against the possessing and educated classes, on the one hand, against the public house and unorganised labour, on the other. So general a statement, of course, requires qualification. With the solid mass of organised workers stands a minority of well-to-do progressives and a large various scattering of lower-grade workers. But it is substantially true that organised labour furnishes the body of the liberal electorate. It is this body that has declared most solidly and definitely for the Budget, against the Lords and against Protection. This solidarity and definiteness are so marked as to constitute a new position in our politics. Taken in conjunction with our analysis of Southern England, with its unassociated servile and ill-paid labour, it serves to bring into relief the deeper interpretation of the election. Never before have the main issues of an election been charged with so much definitely economic import. This growing pressure of economic issues is of course not now confined to this country. But recent events have accelerated the pace and imparted clearer consciousness to the movement. Imperialism, Militarism, Protection, Oligarchy, are suddenly exhibited as a dramatic company on the stage of practical politics. The party which still retains the title Conservative has delivered itself over to the powers of reaction, embodied in explicit demands for Protection and Conscription and an assertion by the hereditary House of a control over finance.

The foreign and domestic policy involved in the new front of Conservatism, aggressively reactionary in form, is best interpreted as belonging to the traditional defences to which the ruling and possessing classes instinctively resort to meet a popular attack upon their economic and social privileges. The policy of land, industrial and social reform, with its accompanying fiscal policy, to which Liberalism and Labourism are now committed, is naturally regarded by them and their intellectual and economic dependents as an attack upon property. Its advocates prefer to describe it as a readjustment of the rights of property upon a basis of greater equality of individual opportunity, with a fuller recognition of state rights in socially-erected property. However described, it involves considerable interference with, and some curtailment of, existing rights of property in land values, liquor licenses and in

other sources of unearned or superfluous wealth. The organised artisans, who are the strength of the attacking or reforming forces, are not socialists or conscious idealists of any order. Though there is some logic in their aims and purposes, it is made applicable to the redress of particular concrete grievances rather than to the realisation of large general aspirations. Some patches of consciousness, dim or clear, show here and there in the general will, but for the most part the movement is instinctive. Definite problems of poverty and injustice have been stirring the minds of the working and poorer classes, and in the group-mind of the associated workmen a number of separate demands have grown into a more or less coherent policy. Freer access to land and a curbing of landlordism in town and country, public assistance against the risks and injuries of proletarian life, and a definite constructive public policy for the prevention and redress of destitution, are the strongest strains in the policy. No doubt other larger, vaguer aspirations are present, making for a fuller life, more pleasure, more knowledge, and a larger share of the wealth and leisure and other opportunities which they see provided for the few by the heavy unremitting toil of the many. Though some active minds among them form general conceptions of a socialistic state, or ride some narrower theory of a panacea, the general mind of this Liberalism is groping after near and tangible results. But the reforms they seek indisputably imply disturbances in the present private system of property and industry, and the public finance which they demand, as an adjunct, involves direct encroachments upon the possessions and incomes of the well-to-do. The power of associated labour is growing, and it is setting itself with more persistency and skill to use the machinery of politics and party. How shall the threatened interests now defend themselves? They can seek to recover some of the positions, constitutional and economic, they had lost. Here is the first meaning of Tariff Reform and of the new legislative claim of the Lords. But Tariff Reform has two purposes. No government in modern times can prevent a constant growth of public expenditure, and modern Conservatism, whether instructive or enlightened, accepts a large and expensive policy of doles to distressed interests, and such 'social reforms' as eleemosynary and police considerations dictate. More money must be found. By indirect taxation the body of the people can best be made to pay their share, and an indirect taxation, which at the same time serves those business interests that are bulwarks of Conservatism, will of necessity be preferred.

It is only when we thus conceive the situation as one which is fundamentally an attack upon and a defence of the present distribution of rights of property, that we can resolve some of the paradoxes that appear upon the surface. Why for instance should

the great consuming South uphold Protection, the first effect of which is to raise the prices of consumables, against the producing North? Why, again, should the 'educated' classes hold so lightly the teaching of history that they should be prepared to fling an obsolete constitutional barrier across the flowing stream of popular liberties?

This election presents more plainly than ever before the instinctive rally of the classes and interests, whose possessions, prestige, privileges and superiority of opportunity, are menaced by the new forces of constructive democracy. Landowners are put to the defence of unearned increments and land assessments; licence-owners fear the loss of their monopoly; great manufacturers and employers fear increased taxation of wealth and the legal strengthening of labour organisations; the Church, conscious of the indifference of the working classes to its spiritual authority and fearing disestablishment and disendowment, defends its hold upon the schools; the services are natural allies of force and economic privilege; the Universities fear lest a too utilitarian populace should repudiate their academic values and explode the solemn futilities of a too decorative culture.

In setting this array of Conservative forces against the pressure of the organised workers for economic security and opportunity, as the central fact of present politics, I am no doubt giving a too exclusively materialistic interpretation. The spirit of both parties is also nourished on finer sentiments and less selfish convictions. Everywhere in town and country sturdy Nonconformity has given a moral glow and a crusading enthusiasm to the radical cause, and has infused a religious passion into the demand for the land.

On the other hand the ranks of Conservatism are sustained by a corresponding glow of patriotism, in the feeling that they are defending the very pillars of the social order threatened by disintegrating forces of socialism within and the menace of a foreign enemy without. This genuine sentimentalism half supplements and half conceals the play of the driving and directing forces which animate politics.

One point, in conclusion, deserves particular attention, for it contains the chief justification of democracy. Though I have found a larger play of rationalism and of conscious individual judgment in this election than in any former one, I cannot attribute to this individual rationalism the chief place as determinant. Organisation and intelligent association for common human purposes constitute the strength of civilised society. Where masses of men are thus associated for work and life, there exist the best conditions for the emergence and the operation of that sane collective will and judgment which, in the sphere of politics, constitutes the spirit and the policy of progressive democracy. It

is not mere individual self-interest, or more intimate acquaintance with the facts of trade and industry, which leads the Lancashire or Yorkshire mill-operative or the Northumbrian miner to reject the Tariff that seems so alluring to the London clubman or the country vicar or the half-pay officer at Brighton or Bournemouth. There is, I feel sure, a half-instinctive, half-conscious drive of collective wisdom, set up by the associated working class life which the needs of modern capitalistic production have established, a genuine spirit of the people, however incomplete in its expression, which makes for political righteousness.

The intelligence of associated labour is less likely to be led astray by sophistry or sentimentalism than the more cultivated but more individualised intelligence of the scholar, the professional man, or the member of that swell-mob commonly termed 'Society.' Nor is its superiority shown merely in the avoidance of error, an instinct of wholesome Conservatism. From the will of such a people proceeds a constructive political energy, moving somewhat blindly and unevenly, and not with firm persistent direction, towards rather shapeless ideals. It is the creative instinct of the collective mind seeking to express itself in politics, very uncertain in its crude handling of material, groping after ill-conceived effects, wasting much, spoiling some, but learning the art called democracy.

I do not mean to claim that the artisans of the North are 'the people.' In some respects they are very limited in aims and outlook. There may even be a certain danger of a new though wider class government, if their superior organisation enabled them to wield for a while the same measure of dominance in politics as that possessed formerly by the landed aristocracy, or latterly by the mercantile and middle trading classes. I can conceive that collective mechanic mind and will impressing themselves too hardly upon our social institutions, and with too little tenderness towards those above and those below, too rigorous in the regimentation of the weaker grades of workers, shirkers and defectives. But all the same it is to this associated labour power that we must look for the rudiments of any coming art of democracy, and to my mind the most significant lesson of the election is the geographical and social testimony to the emergence of this popular power.

J. A. HOBSON.

SECURITY OF PROPERTY UNDER INDIAN LAW.

It is the boast of Western civilization that it has substituted order and security for the confusion and violence of the ancient world. Order is maintained and security is afforded by the honesty and vigilance of a host of officials who are themselves watched over to prevent them from tyrannizing over the people; and it is generally said that we have complete security of person and property. In spite of this assertion oft-repeated, I am not aware that the state in Western countries ever recognized or accepted an absolute obligation to secure every individual in the enjoyment of his property. In case of theft, for instance, the thief is convicted and the stolen property, if recovered, is restored to the owner. But more often than not the property cannot be recovered from the thief even when he has been traced, and the only consolation left to the owner who has lost his property is that others are saved from the attentions of the thief for some time to come. Sooner or later, however, he returns to his calling, for the despair born of poverty is generally proof against any deterrent effects of punishment. Our experience in India is sufficient to demonstrate that an army of officials, wielding extraordinary powers, which would not be tolerated in the West, and not subject to the close scrutiny of a jealous democracy, has been unable to give that security to property which is claimed on behalf of Western civilization by the indirect method of punishing the offender.

Has this been so in the past? Is it to be so in the future? Have the civilizations which flourished for many a long day and decayed, no lessons to teach us? Has there ever been any civilized society in which there was absolute security to property, and if there has been, what was the machinery employed to enforce order and give security? Was it a host of officials as at present? If not, what were the conditions of society that rendered such security possible?

The nature and strength of the police agency employed in any country is obviously a function, to use a mathematical term, of the character of that society. The agency for the suppression of crime has to be determined by the conditions of the society which produces it, and it may be that no agency, however perfect, can cope effectively with crime in the absence of certain moral and religious sanctions or certain economic conditions. Conditions of existence unworthy of a human being will always be fruitful of crime, but

even in a society more happily constituted than others, a thorough investigation of the police agency will yield material for a careful study.

It is no doubt true that there are various communities now scattered over the world who are able to show a clean record as to the class of crime with which we are now concerned. There is at present scarcely any region of the world unexplored by observant travellers; and writers on sociology have brought together and co-ordinated the impressions recorded by travellers and thereby enabled us to draw conclusions regarding the evolution of moral or religious ideas.

I strongly doubt whether it is safe to build theories of evolution on such foundations. However that may be, it seems clear that theories of evolution are not likely to be fruitful of any useful conclusions for our guidance in the present investigation. In his recently published work on the "Origin and Development of Moral Ideas," Prof. Westermarck gives instances of communities amongst whom theft is practically unknown, and he arrives at the conclusion that this immunity is partly due to the absence of ideas of ownership in property. Thus among the community of the Abipones he says, "doors, locks, and other things with which civilized men protect their possessions from thieves were as unnecessary as they are unknown, and if children pilfered melons grown in the garden of the missionaries or chickens reared in their houses, they falsely imagined that these things were free to all or might be taken not much against the will of the owners." To cite only one more of the instances given, he says: "Of the aborigines of West Australia we are told that they occasionally speared the sheep and robbed the potato gardens of the early settlers, simply because they did not understand the settlers' views regarding property, having themselves no separate property in any living animal except their dogs or in any produce of the soil." This no doubt to some extent supports the Professor's conclusion, but there are various other communities to whom this explanation is not applicable, and accordingly another reason is given by him, namely, a superstitious dread of the gods. Instances are enumerated where such fear deterred any appropriation. Certain societies are said to be honest only because they fear that they would otherwise be visited by spirits with punishment. It would perhaps have been an improvement if the habits and customs of each community had been passed in review to show how far either their notions of property or their superstition dictated or influenced their conduct, and as the Professor does not always inform us of the stage of civilization as well as the thieving propensities of a given tribe, we are unable to trace the connection in all the cases cited by him. However, if it is true that the absence of this

particular crime is due to superstition or to non-recognition of ownership, then the outlook for Western civilization is not very hopeful. We are not likely ever to dispense with ownership in property, and though from what is passing round us it is impossible to say that civilization may not go back to the superstition of the savage races, we certainly cannot build up hope on that foundation. If the Professor's theory is anywhere near the truth, we must expect an increase in crime with the advance of civilization. All the communities referred to by Professor Westermarck belong to the earlier stages of civilization. No instance is given by him of a civilized community where the absence of crime may be traced either to communal ownership or to superstition. Whether the civilization of ancient India or China, of Peru or Mexico, will yield any fruitful results remains to be seen. It is perhaps difficult to expect much from Peru or Mexico. About India everything in these days assumes a political tinge and is apt to become a matter of controversy. China apparently offers the best field for inquiry, but only the fringe of China is known to us. For various reasons it would appear best to observe the results yielded by an Indian investigation.

The sources of our information are three-fold:—Greek literature, ancient Hindu literature, and the practice of the people as it has come down to our own day or to times comparatively recent. Amongst the Greek writers is Megasthenes the Greek, who was ambassador for several years at Patna, where Chandragupta reigned, with his Queen, the daughter of his friend and sovereign Seleucus, King of Syria. He is recognised as a writer of scrupulous veracity. According to him, theft amongst the Indians was of very rare occurrence, and they seldom went to law. Their houses and property they generally left unguarded. The country was then in a high state of civilization, maintaining an army of not less than 400,000 men.

Having quoted this testimony from what may be termed remote antiquity, we may refer to the equally pleasing testimony borne by the Mahommedan traveller Ibu Batuta of Tangier, about a part of India which was the last to pass under foreign yoke. He says that thieves were unknown in the country of the Nairs, though it is permissible to doubt the reason given by him. A century later, another Mahommedan traveller says of the chief town of the same part of India: "Such security and justice reign in that city that rich merchants bring to it from maritime countries large cargoes of merchandise which they disembark and deposit in the streets and market places, and for a length of time leave it without consigning it to any one's charge or placing it under a guard."

English writers have brushed aside this sort of description with scorn as a fable. But if our Indian writers depict a state of muni-

cipal government where this is possible, and we are satisfied by actual observation, or otherwise by unimpeachable testimony, that such a municipal government existed, then there is nothing violent in expressing a presumption that a writer like Megasthenes who, when treating of matters which fell under his own observation, has been found trustworthy, may have been right in this instance also.

We will now turn to Hindu sources of information. Both Manu and Yagnavalkya declare that the property stolen by thieves must be restored by the king to his subjects of whatever caste. Both were *Smṛiti* writers, that is, sages or Rishis raised far above ordinary men, and endowed with divine vision, whose injunctions are therefore treated with a corresponding degree of respect. Later commentators, whenever they found any of these ordinances inconvenient or unsuitable to the prevailing practice of their times, either twisted them so as to support contemporary usage or produced some other ordinance of another mythical sage to combat the obsolete view or explained them away by saying that the *Smṛitis* applied to an older and more virtuous era. Therefore, when we find them citing with approval any ancient ordinance, we may take it for granted that it was consonant with the usage of the commentator's own place and time. A few of Manu's commentators simply repeat in their own words the old ordinance cited above, *i.e.*, that the king must recover the stolen property and restore it to the owner. Others add that if he is unable to do so, *he must reimburse the owner out of his own treasury*. A well-known commentator or rather lawyer who has written a treatise based on Yagnavalkya, and whose authority is recognised in all parts of India except only in so far as it has been superseded by local authorities, distinctly declares that whether the king is able to trace the stolen property or not, he must reimburse the owner. It is his sacred duty, and if he fails in discharging it, he will incur the sin or take upon himself the sins the owners may commit which attaches to the thief. It may be interesting to give here a rough translation of the passage from the writings of that celebrated lawyer: "A king should recover from thieves the property stolen by them and give back the same to those of the villagers living within his dominions to whom the property originally belonged. If he be indifferent (he takes upon himself) the sin of all the villagers. If, on the other hand, he is unable to get back the stolen property, even after efforts to recover the same, he should pay its equivalent out of his own treasury." Two older writers are quoted as supporting this view. It is important to note, if possible, how the precept was actually carried out in practice.

The king devolved his obligation on each parish. Under this ordinance if a theft is committed within a parish or village, then that parish must make the loss good to the owner: or, if the thief

can be traced to another parish, then the duty is transferred to that parish, unless the latter can show that the thief has passed its own boundaries. Even if the thief be not within the parish, but within a certain distance from it, then the parish has to make good the loss unless the thief can be traced to another village. If the theft takes place in the midst of several parishes, then all of them are responsible. See YAGNAVALKYA, II, 36, to which *Vignaneswara* adds: "If the king is not able even thus to restore the property he must pay the equivalent out of his own treasury."

We have next to see how the parish carried out its duty. In India while the king provided security against external violence in a manner which will be presently noticed, the people were left to make their own arrangements in such a manner as seemed good to themselves. Each parish appointed its own watchmen and determined its own mode of remunerating them. Some land was generally set aside for the watchmen, on which the king levied no revenue. The watchmen obtained a share of the crops also at harvest time. It was their duty to know everything about the residents of the parish, to watch strangers, and at the same time to render all assistance to them and to see that no theft took place. If any theft occurred in the parish, the watchers must recover the property, and if they were not able to do it or to trace the thief to beyond the village limits, they must pay the equivalent in value to the owner. So deeply ingrained are these habits in the minds of the people, that, notwithstanding that the Madras Government have been doing their best to get rid of every tradition connected with the ancient institution of watchers or outlayers, only a few months ago a village watchman was killed by the parishioners for refusing to pay them the value or to trace the thief. The watchmen's offices are hereditary, and as late as 1859, when in the Madras Presidency the old system was practically abolished, the English officials found that the watchmen protected the property of their parish. The Police Inspector-General who then had to inquire into the soundness of the system wrote: "the responsible establishment, if duly paid by the people, made good all losses incurred through their neglect." Even in these days, after 50 years of police administration, it is not uncommon to find villagers engaging their own watchmen on the old terms of paying fees in consideration of their making good all losses by theft.

To protect against thefts outside the villages, there were chieftains to whom the king had granted lands and also the revenue (or a proportion of it) which he was entitled to receive from the parish.

This was also in accordance with ancient law. According to old Hindu lawyers, "when the track of a thief passes out of a parish but cannot be definitely followed into another parish the *Margapala*

(road-keepers) and *Dikpala* (those guarding the entrances) should be made to pay the loss." Whether this is in addition to the joint obligation of the surrounding villages or applies only when the parish is not liable, is not stated. The Poligar chieftains in this Presidency who are not of Mahomedan creation and who trace their title back to the Hindu rulers are generally the descendants of those ancient chieftains. Many of them were in the old days known by an expressive term *Menkavalgars*, "superior watchmen." If any theft took place within their jurisdiction, they had to pay the owner the value of the property. As in the case of village watchers, the British Government found this system also in full force. Not only were these Poligars and Zemindars in possession of their lands, but they were also in receipt of revenue from the villagers, part of which was retained by them for their services, the rest being alone remitted to the king. When the revenue was collected by others, the *Menkavalgars* received fees from the villagers for the protection which they afforded. These men employed their own detective agency.

The noticeable characteristic in this system is the absolute security of property which it afforded. Whether this property is yielded up by the thief or not, the owner gets it or its value. The agency consisted in a special class of detectives, trained from their childhood in the pursuit of thieves. With full knowledge of the scene of the offence, absolutely innocuous for mischief, as they were under the control of the parish, and deeply interested in the prevention and detection of crime, more so perhaps than the owner himself, these watchers were at once the police and the insurers of their society.

All accounts agree that as a result of this system crimes against property were rare within the limits of a parish. Outside its limits, the scheme did not work so satisfactorily in the days of which alone we have any record. The chief was a powerful man not always amenable to the public opinion of the parish or village community. Their only hold on him was the refusal to pay the king's revenue, of which he kept the whole or at any rate a share. This payment he was often powerful enough to enforce, and when the central power was weak, it must be admitted there was no adequate protection for travellers against the duly constituted guardians of the highways though there was not much reason to fear other oppressors. It was otherwise when the sovereign was powerful.

The system to which we have referred is undoubtedly one of a very remote and venerable antiquity. This liability of the Sovereign is declared in Gautama Dharma Sutra, the oldest now extant and earlier than 600 B.C. In a weakened form, the services of the village watchmen continued to be rendered to the village

community till about 1859, when the administrative policy of the Madras Government required material modifications. From certain records recently published by the Madras Government, it appears that the East India Company found that many chieftains were in possession of lands expressly given to them for the purposes above indicated, and that the obligation of the chieftains to pay the owner the value of the stolen property was fully recognized. All these lands were resumed by Government on the ground that the owner was no longer required to perform any police duties.

I am not aware that this absolute security was recognized by any other system of jurisprudence. The Statute of Winchester (1285, repealed only in 1827) made the 'hundred' liable for thefts with violence committed within it. This was carrying out with reference to a particular species of theft, the old liability of the "frithborg" which prevailed under the later Anglo-Saxon kings, and in the days of the Conqueror and his sons whereby all the members of the association, so called, were security for the good behaviour of each of them and had to produce him if he were charged with an offence, and if they failed to do so, had to make good any mischief he had done. It also appears to have been the law that "if any one trace a track from one shire to another, let the men who there are next take to it and pursue the track till it is known to the reeve; let him then with the people of his district take to it and pursue the track out of his shire if he can, but if he cannot, let him pay the angylæ of the property." The object was to compel the reeves to assist one another. This, of course, is very different from the absolute security of property given by Hindu jurisprudence, which imposes the obligation on the king who passes it on to others with ample means of discharging that obligation. Such restitution or compensation is not to be regarded as a punishment. The same law books which enforce this compensation lay down punishments of varying degree for different kinds of theft. The compensation is not dependent on the recovery of the property from the thief.

This probably in some degree accounts for the attitude of the people towards the Police in India, and it may also furnish an answer to the complaints of officials against the people for their indifference and neglect to help them. Under the English administration the conviction and punishment of the culprit is more important than the recovery of the stolen property for the benefit of the aggrieved owner. The conception of theft as a crime in English and Roman Law had its origin in the desire to prevent the indignant owner taking the law into his own hands. It is to keep the peace more than to restore property to the owner that the thief is convicted. The long ingrained habits of the Indians turn their views exactly in the opposite direction. They care more, and

perhaps really only, for the recovery of their property, and they do not bestir themselves to help an investigation, attended with great annoyance and inconvenience which in the end usually does not benefit them very much. It may, no doubt, be that the indirect effect of our system in giving security of property is great. But once the thief is caught, there is under our present system a relaxation in the efforts to secure the stolen property. And it cannot possibly have the same result as the ancient system we have been considering.

It may be said, no doubt, that it is not the duty of the State to recover a man's stolen property for him any more than to compensate him for loss by any wrong which is not a crime. Still less is it the duty of the State to compensate him when such property is not recovered. These are questions which I do not now propose to discuss, but it appears to me to be plain that no Government which does not undertake to compensate a man for loss sustained by theft is entitled to plume itself on giving security to property, except such indirect protection as may be involved in the administration of justice, maintenance of order, and keeping the peace of the country. The share of the produce received by the ancient kings in India was the fund for maintaining the effective police system which gave that security.

SANKARAN NAIR.

SOCIOLOGY IN THE ENGLISH NOVEL.*

ANY endeavour to set forth in a few pages the sociological significance of the novel must of necessity yield results of a very meagre and imperfect kind. The title chosen for this paper seemed at first glance to fix a reasonable limit to the subject, whereas in point of fact it implies the throwing of a net over the whole field of modern fiction. Let me say at the outset that the scope of the inquiry is restricted by ruling out the whole province of continental fiction, notwithstanding that its sociological importance is greater—I imagine very much greater—than that of our own. In France and Russia, in Germany and Scandinavia, the novel is or has been a product of immense import, more closely and deeply related, it would seem, to the national intelligence than in England; but even if I were competent to discuss it that part of the subject would have to be omitted. As it is the material is unmanageable in amount and variety, and I cannot hope to do more than indicate a few points for consideration and discussion.

The difficulty is not to discover sociology in fiction, but to find anything therein that is without sociological value and meaning. The truth obviously is that in the novel, which is the characteristic art form of modern literature, we have the most comprehensive presentation of contemporary society—inchoate of course, and of differing worth, but extraordinarily detailed, various, and in large measure truthful. The middle period of the nineteenth century witnessed a remarkable development of the English novel. From being merely a narrative of passion, fashion, or adventure, a record of individual character and humours, it became the complex medium for psychological analysis, for ethical theory and discussion, and for the description and exposition of social and economic change. The novel of to-day is in a fairly full sense the house of life, and its mansions are without number. There is no piece of the world, no section of society, no province of experience, no movement, occupation, or amusement, that is reckoned outside the novelist's sphere of influence and exploitation, and, what is still more important, there emerges continually, in one form or another, a sense of the relation existing between the individual and the group. The whole difference between the 18th and the 19th and the 20th centuries is to be seen, vividly illustrated, in the typical examples of their prose fiction—in the contrast between *Clarissa*

* A paper read before the Sociological Society, December 14, 1909.

Harlowe and Tess of the Durbervilles, the Vicar of Wakefield and Robert Elsmere, Tristram Shandy and Richard Feverel, Tom Jones and George Ponderevo, the Man of Feeling and the Man who was Thursday.

But it is not only in the types of character that the difference is displayed. We may see it still more strikingly shown in the contrast between the worlds presented by the novel at different periods. Not much more than a century ago the novelist was content to depict his hero in the conventional limits of comedy, touching upon or playing with the accepted scenes and modes of action. To-day the entire range of society is taken as his province. Apart from stories weighted with a specific purpose, we have, and have had for the past half century or more, novels designed to present particular classes of society, particular sets of social conditions, particular aspects of life in country or town: the world of wealth and luxury, and its opposite—the hideous nether world of debased village or industrial district; the specialised world of work, from commerce, medicine, and law to the endless range of occupations created by the subdivisions of industry and technical skill; the world of regional custom and culture, whether of cockney slum or northern hamlet, West Country moor or Scottish kailyard; the world of religion and ceremonial, of rationalist revolt or superstitious reaction—the church, the conventicle, the hall of science; higher criticism, lower experiment, psychic phenomena; the world of political and social theory and effort; the world of finance and exploitation; the world of pathology, of drugs and drink; the world of art, of sport, of invention, of historic reconstruction and prophetic foreshadowing—each presentation being in varying degrees of closeness and intelligence related to the enduring facts of life and growth and sex. All which is no more than to say that modern fiction is descriptive sociology in a larger and truer sense (as Mr. Frederic Harrison, for one, might be disposed to admit) than the term possessed when it was used by Herbert Spencer. As the sociology of the ancient world is enshrined in the Hebrew Bible and Homer, in the Vedas and the Mahabharata, in saga, folk-story, or Arthurian legend—so the modern world has its multifarious record in the pages of the novel.

Consider the matter in reference to the transition of English society from the old system of hand labour to the epoch of organised industry. Suppose we were dependent for our knowledge of England, rural and urban, between 1750 and 1850, upon the sources tapped by the political historians—the Macaulays and Leckys, Spencer Walpoles and Justin McCarthys, or even by an economic historian like Thorold Rogers. Our condition would be pitiable. The only England of a century ago that lives for the English man or woman to-day is the England preserved by poet

and playwright, novelist and painter: the town of Hogarth, Fielding, and Dickens; the country of Cowper, Crabbe, and Wordsworth, of George Morland and George Eliot. The only sources of knowledge which can in any sense compete with the production of the imaginative artist are the personal records, the biographies of individuals, and these of course are glaringly imperfect. Put, for sociological purposes, Harriet Martineau's "History of the Forty Years' Peace," by the side of the novels in which, during her first and greatest period, George Eliot enshrined the rural England of the generation following the Napoleonic wars. Or, to make the contrast still more pointed, consider two separate aspects of George Eliot's own work: the laboured picture of the Radical movement in *Felix Holt* on the one hand, and, on the other, the brilliant little essay in sociology, the description of the coach road and countryside, with which that least satisfying of political novels opens.

For the sake of convenience in this very rough study of the subject I distinguish three classes of novels: (1) those which, without any specific ethical or critical purpose, treat of the contemporary world as it presents itself to the writer; (2) those which, for purposes of scientific, revolutionary, or philanthropic attack, are designed to expose a particular system, social evil, or group of conditions; and (3) those which, while not necessarily attacking or deliberately maintaining anything, are in a special sense the product of contemporary forces, themselves part and symptom of the tendency of the time. The mass of Victorian fiction goes of course into the first category: that is to say, it is entirely or mainly narrative and pictorial; its authors are concerned primarily with the story, which depicts a piece of the world in its familiar and unchallenging aspects. Here, as I have already pointed out, is invaluable material for the sociologist and the historian. It comprises a record more or less actual, more or less complete, of society in its continual process of change, lying ready for the interpretative skill of the sociologist or sociological historian.

To the second class, the class of novels into which a purpose in some degree detached from the story has been put, belong such books as those in which some of the greatest and very many of the second-rate Victorians assailed the evils of their day. Dickens was the most conspicuous, as he was probably the first, to make use of the novel to this end. The exposure of the private schools in *Nicholas Nickleby*, which was only the second of his novels, began a series in which the workhouse, the prisons, the Court of Chancery, the public departments and many other institutions were arraigned. Dickens, as it is hardly necessary to say, was far less a sociologist than a humanitarian reformer. His eye was on the individual—as well, of course, as on the picturesque possibilities of the institution he had marked down. Some have even main-

tained that he indulged in the exaggerations of the sensational journalist. Mr. Squeers, for example, has found defenders—just as, according to certain irresponsible enemies of the new education, he has found imitators in the kindergarten and the specialism of child study. A more pertinent criticism of Dickens as social reformer, however, is perhaps that he was apt to succumb to the temptation of slaying the slain. It is asserted that the debtors' prison and the Court of Chancery had been taken in hand before he touched them. Perhaps so; but the evils of those institutions were quite scandalous enough, and no one surely would contend that reform had come anywhere near the Circumlocution Office when Mr. Tite Barnacle was conceived. But it is a point not without interest that what was still called the New Poor Law had been in force for several years before *Oliver Twist* was written, and that a very short time afterwards the beneficence of its main provisions was being insisted upon by Charles Kingsley, in those days the most fervid of Christian Socialists. The philosophical pedigree of the humanitarian novel is a subject that would repay inquiry. Dickens was clearly an opponent, in sentiment at least, of that great Benthamite measure the Poor Law of 1834, and yet his kinship with the Utilitarians is undeniable. He belonged to them; his novels form part of their monument in literature, just as the socio-political romances of Benjamin Disraeli stand for the revolt of Young England against the despotism of Jeremy Bentham.

Kingsley is, I suppose, the first English novelist who wrote in any sense from the inside of the democratic movement, and his two early books give him a place among the writers who attempt the record of a social phase, instead of treating a movement as an accessory or as an excuse for satire or condemnation. It is easy to contend that Kingsley was too much of a preacher to write a good story, and too much of a squarson to write a good story of Chartism—and the criticism may be justified in some measure as applied to *Yeast*. It is far from true, however, in reference to *Alton Locke*, which, after all, is the one contemporary record in fiction of the upheavals of 1848 that can properly be said to have survived. What Kingsley began Mrs. Gaskell continued. *Mary Barton* is as valuable a document as *Alton Locke* for the understanding of the industrial conditions of that pregnant epoch, while in quite another genre the exquisite pages of *Cranford* take rank with the most perfect scenes of George Eliot as the picture of a society almost as remote from Edwardian England as the London of Chaucer and Piers Plowman.

The example of Dickens in weaving his story around some tottering or detested institution was followed by Charles Reade, who found in the convict system or the private lunatic asylum precisely the kind of quarry demanded by his peculiar methods of

preparation. Charles Reade adopted and perfected a system of accumulation and tabulation which, one may assume, has procured for him an altar of especial sanctity among the divinities worshipped by sociologists of a certain school. A lawyer by profession, he was a novelist by arduous training. The materials amidst which he worked were an immeasurable collection of extracts and cuttings, classified in ledgers, from an enormous range of books (especially books of travel) and from newspapers, official returns, and reports of royal commissions. One can see the eyes of the respected director of the temporary sociological laboratory lately installed at the University of London glisten with envy as this portentous equipment of the Victorian novelist is recalled; but by way of consolation one may note that the results were not always very encouraging to ourselves. Reade and Dickens both endeavoured to handle in imaginative form one movement which, in its relation to industrial society a generation ago, was of vital significance—the attainment by the trade unions of a legal status—the first struggle in which the strength of organised labour was tested. Dickens's contribution to the problem may be found in *Hard Times*, the dismal failure which Ruskin tried so hard to praise; Reade's attempt is *Put yourself in his place*, a novel much less below his ordinary level than *Hard Times* is below Dickens's. Together the books may fairly be taken to stand as examples of the writing of social novels from the outside, with little, very little, understanding of the issues involved and no vision at all of the forces at work.

Coming now to the transition period which divided the reign of the great Victorian novelists from the work of our immediate contemporaries, there are, I suggest, two names which stand out with especial prominence—the names of George Gissing and Mark Rutherford. There has been a fashion among the critics during the past few years to speak in extravagant terms of both these admirable writers. We are invited to acclaim them as artists hardly below the greatest. This indeed may be right, though to me it seems to admit of much dispute. Happily, however, we are not called upon here to determine the literary question, and there can, I imagine, be no question as to the extraordinary sociological value attaching to the work of both. Until Mark Rutherford arose English provincial Puritanism had had no worthy representative among the novelists. Nonconformity had figured of course to a considerable extent in fiction. It had been ridiculed by Dickens, sketched with less obvious satire by Thackeray, pictured with noble if imperfect sympathy by George Eliot in *Silas Marner* and elsewhere, presented with ampler knowledge and more accurate touch by writers of lesser fame. But hitherto no writer had done anything to present it as a social system dominating large areas

of provincial England and opposing a harsh resistance to the rising tide of humanism and science. English Nonconformity as it existed until a quarter of a century ago lives (or rather dies) in the pages of Mark Rutherford. Nowhere else, it seems to me, will the historian of the future come upon so truthful a record of its social system, its domesticities, its high and stern, if hard and narrow, conception of right, its unbending resistance to the new ideas, and—if one may be pardoned for quoting the phrase which Matthew Arnold made by iteration so tiresome—"its hideousness, its intense ennui."

In the realm of fiction more strictly described as sociological George Gissing is a very important figure. He died six years ago, at 46, having produced on an average one book every year for a quarter of a century. His character and literary life were a dark puzzle to his contemporaries. We know now that he was a destitute alien in the region called realism, that he was a passionate lover of beauty and of classic culture, with an overmastering enthusiasm for Imperial Rome. But to his readers and critics he figured as the embodiment of nearly everything that he most disliked. He was condemned for modernity, when he ought to have been hailed by the Classicists as a brother, and, as one of his interpreters has reminded us, he was by a well-nigh incredible feat of criticism likened to Emile Zola. As a matter of fact, we must conclude, he breathed an atmosphere which he loathed, and wrote for the most part about people whom he despised and disliked, about ways of life into which he had never entered. His life in London repeated all the weary and heartbreaking appearances which for centuries have marked the career of the man of letters who, being condemned to poverty, is too inflexible ever to yield to the demands of the market. The marvel is that Gissing, a man of the study, should have been able under whatever pressure to picture the London of the eighties as he has done it. His readers (small blame to them) identified his literary creed with that of the author of "Mr. Bailey, Grocer," in *New Grub Street* :—

What I really aim at is an absolute realism in the sphere of the ignobly decent. The field, as I understand it, is a new one; I don't know any writer who has treated ordinary vulgar life with fidelity and seriousness. Zola writes deliberate tragedies; his vilest figures become heroic from the place they fill in a strongly imagined drama. I want to deal with the essentially unheroic, with the day to day life of the vast majority of the people who are at the mercy of paltry circumstance. . . . I am going to reproduce it verbatim, without one single impertinent suggestion of any point of view save that of honest reporting. The result will be something unutterably tedious. Precisely. That is the stamp of ignobly decent life. If it were anything *but* tedious it would be untrue.

This is a perfect description of a certain modern school of fiction, but it does not by any means express George Gissing's theory of

art. On the contrary, the theory which he held with passionate conviction was as nearly as possible its opposite.

The truth apparently is, as Mr. Wells points out in an admirable piece of exposition, that at the outset of his career Gissing got hold of a false ideal. When he began to write, in 1880, English fiction was still under the dominance of the Victorian tradition. There was nothing for the imaginative artist to do save to construct novels on the great scale. Moreover, the serious craftsman was impressed by the vast designs of the French giants. Balzac, the sociological novelist *par excellence*, had compressed the France of the Second Empire into *La Comédie Humaine*; Zola was engaged upon a kindred though widely different enterprise for the France of the Third Republic. The only road open for the ambitious English novelist was already marked out. Gissing entered upon it and paid a heavy price for what appears to have been a tragic blunder. For us who have entered into his labours the result, comprised in the series of books beginning with *The Unclassed* in 1884 and ending with *The Private Papers of Henry Ryecroft* in 1903, is an inestimable companion record to Mr. Charles Booth's survey of the life and labour of London. One cannot believe that the London of the eighth and ninth decades of the last century, the London which all of us hope is now in process of being improved away, will ever find so dismally true a presentation as it has found in Gissing's novels. I would cite especially *New Grub Street*, with its notably accurate forecast of the New Journalism, and *In the Year of Jubilee*, that unsurpassed picture of South London Suburbia—displaying an enduring family life, an absence of culture and amenity, together with such contracted notions of conduct, comfort, and joy, and—most terrible of all—so deep a degradation of woman, as surely are unexcelled by anything in the civilised world. Gissing hated it all, but he has preserved it, describing with his highest power just those parts of the metropolitan wilderness which represent the "ignobly decent" in the fullest sense of the term—those districts in comparison with which, as he put it, Lambeth is picturesque and venerable, St. Giles's romantic, Hoxton clean and suggestive of domesticity, Whitechapel full of poetry, and Limehouse is sweet with sea-breezes.

I am conscious that it is coming perilously near absurdity to discuss the novels of the last generation without giving a full measure of space to George Meredith and Thomas Hardy; and yet I must omit them both. The work of Mr. Hardy especially is of profound sociological import, but inasmuch as it is concerned with a particular province of England and is the product of a genius and temperament extraordinarily individual and detached, there is perhaps fair reason for leaving it outside the scope of this paper.

To most readers, it may be, the novelist most characteristic of the decade which comes between the two jubilee years of the Victorian era is Mrs. Humphry Ward, whose "Marcella" is an admirable transition type. Marcella is a later embodiment of Dorothea Casaubon; she is Dorothea as modified by a generation of women's higher education and preoccupation with the social question. The particular blend of philanthropy and socialism which she affects is sufficiently familiar, and her scheme of a reconstructed village with the lady of the manor as directing providence has, as most of us know, commanded many adherents. The successors of Marcella, in real life and in fiction, have advanced some way beyond her point of view, though it is worth noting that Mrs. Ward herself in recent years has exercised her talent in other fields.

So far the task of indicating the main features of English fiction from the sociological point of view has been comparatively simple. It becomes a matter of much greater difficulty to distinguish the characteristics of the host of men and women who in the first decade of the twentieth century have made the novel the vehicle of social analysis and criticism and to detach the attributes and aims which mark them off from their predecessors. It will not, I think, be disputed that the novel during the past few years has reflected more closely and accurately than ever before the movement of the time. The truth of this statement might be demonstrated in many different ways, but it may suffice if I note the astonishing number and variety of stories treating more or less directly of the problems of the city, of labour and poverty, of social disorders and ameliorative agencies. Let it be granted that there is a fashion in these things, and that the abounding harvest of slum fiction which marked the close of the nineteenth century was in no small degree an illustration of the adaptability of authors and publishers, an unashamed attempt to give the public what it wants. But the admission does not amount to much, since the story of the slum, from *The Nether World* and *Badalia Herodsfoot* to the cheery sketches of Mr. Pett Ridge, is only one department of the province of what one may call civic fiction.

The methods of approach in this region are multifarious. There is the method, wildly remote from actuality, which one is apt to associate with the half-forgotten work of Sir Walter Besant. There is the method, not very easy to characterise, of Mr. Arthur Morrison. There is the tone of superior philanthropy, of which the examples are very numerous. One that occurs to me as thoroughly typical is Mr. Arthur Paterson's *John Glynn*, a story of C.O.S. work in Hoxton, wherein the reader will find C.O.S. methods described, with unaffected admiration, in a fashion calculated very seriously to damage that venerable organisation. There is the bright satiric method of Mr. Richard Whiteing in *No. 5*

John Street and *Ring in the New*; there is the tolerant and sympathetic method of Mr. Pett Ridge and Mr. Edwin Pugh; there is the severely detached method of those writers who, like Mr. Galsworthy, have understood and accepted the principle of the scientific survey.

From our sociological point of view there are two contemporary novelists who will probably seem to call conspicuously for notice in any paper of this kind—Mr. John Galsworthy and Mr. H. G. Wells. These are, if I mistake not, the men of our day who are commonly regarded, perhaps with something less than justice, as sociologists first and novelists afterwards. Mr. Galsworthy is a writer of whom every critic, and every student of society, must wish to speak with respect. It is true to say of him that he writes of social and industrial problems from the inside. He is the example one would naturally quote in order to prove the immense advance in knowledge and sincerity made by English social fiction since the mid-Victorian epoch. Contrast any one of his stories or plays—*Strife* or *Fraternity* for instance—with *Felix Holt* or *Hard Times*, and note how vast the difference is. Mr. Galsworthy's method is that of passionless analysis—whether of the idea and implication of private property, the tradition of an English country house, the ruthless working of the English caste system, as in *Fraternity*. This last book furnishes us with a type of present-day sociologist which has doubtless evoked a smile of recognition from members of the Sociological Society—a cool, young student who, in company with a girl in whom he takes a more or less emotional interest, explores the slums of Notting Dale, applying Mr. Booth's poverty map as he goes along, thus :—

The street now ended in a wide road formed of little low houses.

"Black," said Martin, "here; all down this road—casual labour, criminals, loafers, drunkards, consumps. Look at the faces." . . .

"Martin, something must be done!"

The young doctor did not reply. His face still wore its pale, sarcastic, observant look. He gave her arm a squeeze with a half-contemptuous smile.

A pleasant little touch, indicating, one supposes, the sociologist in love, new style.

Of Mr. Wells's later and more important work I have left myself no room to speak except in the briefest terms. To the gratification of many among us, Mr. Wells would appear to have abandoned the province of mechanical prophecy—forecasting, as a novelist of a quite different order, Father Hugh Benson, also does, an intolerable world of glass and rubber tubes—and to have found himself in the sphere of social analysis. He has realised, more completely I would suggest than any of his contemporaries in fiction, the character and meaning of the neo-technic era.

Tono-Bungay may reasonably be regarded as the typical English novel of the decade, with its vivid contrasts of feudal village and country town, the dinginess of lower middle-class life in London and the extravagances of the new empire of finance. Mr. Wells's vision of London is extraordinarily good: as sure as Gissing's and far more strikingly presented. Gissing is a writer of low vitality. In common with Mark Rutherford he has an almost unpardonable literary fault, the habit of whining. Mr. Wells, on the contrary, is a writer of overflowing vitality; the pervading quality of all his books is energy. The London amidst which he moves is substantially the same as Gissing's: that is, it is the London of the basement area; but how immense is the difference between the two—in temper, criticism, and intellectual challenge!

In Mr. Wells's novels, considered as the result of social analysis, there seem to me two main defects. First, he takes no note of the place of religion in the lower middle class, the class from which, as Mr. Arnold Bennett asserts, most English novelists have sprung. One would have supposed it difficult to keep this element, as Mr. Wells has done, out of such admirable studies as *Kipps* or *Love and Mr. Lewisham*. And secondly, he is devoid of the historic sense. He has indeed a frank contempt for history, and is inclined to glory in the fact. This is a defect which would almost make it necessary for us to class Mr. Wells as an anti-sociologist. Despite his biological training, and his essays in social reconstruction, he would appear to be without belief in the social organism. In his eyes the past is dead, and his remedy is to cut it off. He is, in brief, a catastrophist. For him the method of human advance is not growth, not development, but a miracle of salvation, a sudden illumination—some wonderful visit, stolen bacillus, food of the gods, or comet's tail—annihilating the old and making all things new. The vast bonfire of *The Days of the Comet* in which the past is calcined may be read as a flaring symbol of Mr. Wells's social creed.

But Mr. Wells, in obeying the impulse of destruction, is very far from singular. On the contrary, he is with the majority of his fellows. All the ablest, best equipped, and most sincere artists in fiction are ranged against the established order. Is there as a matter of fact any prominent writer to-day who is on the side of the orthodox creed, a defender of existing society? No one, I imagine, would cite Mr. Belloc or Mr. Chesterton in this connection; and, oddly enough, the most conservative of all is probably Mrs. Humphry Ward, who has taken her stand by the old view of marriage. While in the press and elsewhere there is noticeable a strong conservative tendency, the force of intelligence and imagination in this the most influential form of literary activity is concentrated in a merciless and continuous

onslaught on things as they are. Contrast in this connection the weight of George Eliot's influence on the side of essential orthodoxy, as in *Scenes of Clerical Life* or *The Mill on the Floss*, with the influence of her successors from Thomas Hardy to John Galsworthy. The social novel that really counts is not the one which sets out to describe or expose some evil practice or condition, some degenerate or mischievous institution, but the novel that is itself the product of new forces; hence the immense significance of the prevailing attitude and temper. Think of it in relation to a specific and quite ordinary case. The clever daughter of a country parson or doctor just emancipated from the schoolroom opens the regular box from Mudie's or Smith's. She finds therein, let us say, five or six novels of to-day and yesterday, all of which as a matter of course have been certified by the censor as not improper. Let us suppose the batch to be made up in this way:—

Thomas Hardy—*Jude the Obscure*.

H. G. Wells—*Tono-Bungay*.

John Galsworthy—*Fraternity*.

Samuel Butler—*The Way of all Flesh*.

Harold Frederic—*Illumination*.

Our vicar's daughter, being a discerning young woman, could not be for a moment in doubt as to the reality of the themes and the sincerity of the writers; but would she not have a rather terrifying feeling that the world of thought, belief, and convention in which she had grown up was tumbling about her ears?

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

THE disinclination to accept Sociology as a science is very persistent. At our oldest Universities there is a strong disposition to believe that the general treatment of social phenomena can never go beyond a philosophy of social life, and that therefore a department or chair of Sociology is unnecessary. We may suspect that this attitude is partly due to innate conservatism, combined with a dread lest *ex-cathedra* utterances of quasi-scientific social theories should bear too obviously upon social policy. But a very similar attitude is found in a quarter in which at any rate no trace of conservatism or timidity can be suspected. Progressive idealists, such as Mr. H. G. Wells, are equally emphatic in their assertion that Plato, and not Comte, is the true type of a Sociologist, and that the creation and discussion of Utopias is the proper method of Sociology. And finally, the special social sciences are still looked down upon by the severely scientific physicist or biologist, who will not allow that Economics, for example, has a right to the title of a science.

My object in this paper is to consider the validity of these objections, and, more definitely, to test the claims of general Sociology to be a scientific interpretation of social change or a science of society in the full sense of an authoritative guide to social progress. This claim, very definitely formulated by Comte in the first instance, and adopted by most modern Sociologists who have dealt with general Sociology or social dynamics, is expressed in the assertion that Sociology not only is or will be a unifying, co-ordinating, synthetising science of social phenomena, but must also be accepted eventually as a directive science, establishing a growing body of laws or principles bearing upon social progress, and more or less authoritatively guiding the course of social change. The claim may be analysed into three parts: first, that Sociology is really a science of the same order as other sciences, using the same methods and reaching the same kind of results; secondly, that its results, like those of other sciences, carry with them some measure of provision of the future; and thirdly, *pie* that it can not merely predict what will be, but can also affirm what should be, the course of progress. This last claim is of course implicit in the assertion that general Sociology is a true science, and is explicitly formulated by those who assert that social

telics is an integral part of the science, and that a social technology will be a necessary result of its elaboration.

I do not of course maintain that all Sociologists would endorse the threefold claim here defined. Those who limit the subject-matter of their science to the phenomena of association (as distinct from the whole social process) stand on different ground; so also do many of the psychological sociologists who limit their task to elucidating the psychic mechanism of changes of idea among associated human beings. But the views I am putting forward for examination are certainly explicitly stated or implicitly contained in the writings of most general Sociologists from Comte and Spencer to Dr. Albion Small; and the latter's complete definition may probably be taken as typical, namely that "Sociology is a unified view of human life, derived (a) from analysis of all discoverable phases of human activity, past and present; (b) from synthesis of these activities in accordance with their functional meanings; (c) from telic interpretation of the whole thus brought to view, in so far as its tendencies are indicated in the process analysed; and it is finally a body of guiding principles, derived from this analysis, of the conduct of life."

Again, I am of course aware that most Sociologists who would subscribe to this definition, would hasten to modify their claims by asserting that Sociology has not yet found itself; it is waiting for its Newton, they say; its scientific character, its power of prevision, its power of guidance, all belong to the future; at present the Sociologist is often unscientific in his methods, usually a bad prophet, and always a dangerous guide. But the fact remains that they are all committed to Comte's position, that "the mastery of the last and chief domain is incomplete if the theory of the human order is confined to determining its nature and its preparation without understanding its ulterior development." That is to say, social prevision and social guidance,—telics and technology—will eventually be instruments in the hands of the Sociologist, to be used in furtherance of a well-understood progress, capable at each step of intelligent direction. This is what the public is asked to expect. Sociology will synthetise *all* the social forces, will bring into focus *all* the important elements of social welfare, will unify *all* the separate social sciences, will explain *all* the factors of social progress, and as a result will increasingly supply guidance in all questions of social change. Its aim embraces the full sequence of "*savoir, prévoir, pouvoir*";—as though, someday (as Mr. H. G. Wells has mockingly put it), the Sociologist will be going about the world with the authority of a sanitary engineer.

Now I believe it may be shown that the threefold claim of the general Sociologist is invalid at every point. Let me take first the implications which lie behind the assertion that Sociology stands

in the same line with all other true sciences, in regard to method and results, allowance being made for the greater complexity of its subject-matter, and therefore also the lessened precision of its discovered laws. This assumption implies (1) that throughout all social (human) phenomena the same process of causation is at work as is found throughout all other phenomena, and that there is absolute determination of the whole social future by knowable conditions discoverable in the past and present.

(2) That the course of change is determined by certain permanent or continually recurrent factors or forces, which may be called the dominant factors of change, whose mode of operation upon the subjects to be considered is constant and knowable; and further, that the subject-matter or material is also knowable and constant in all its important characteristics,—that is, in its causative elements and its modes of reaction to the dominant factors.

It will not be denied that these are the fundamental hypotheses of all scientific prevision; they alone enable us to state a scientific law which may be accepted for all time and made the basis (as indeed it carries with it) a confident statement of future happenings. Such a law of course takes always the hypothetical form—"Given these or those conditions, then such and such results will and must be found." The truth of the law rests upon the assumption that the conditions (forces, re-acting subjects, and necessary environment) are essentially the same, whenever they occur, in their action and results, and are knowable and definable; or, if they change, that the change is always along orderly and knowable lines. The value of the law rests upon the assumption that the conditions do in fact exist commonly or recur frequently, and are of definite importance in relation to the total result.

So far as these assumptions are valid as applied to social science, just so far Comte's great contention must be admitted, namely that Sociology stands in the same line with all other sciences, only differing in the degree of precision with which its laws can be formulated. The subject-matter differs in complexity, and complexity alone; but this difference is one of degree only, and there is no other difference. Sociology is therefore at the extreme end of the line which begins with Mathematics and Physics and ends with Biology and Sociology.

Let me here admit at once that there are certain limited forms of the science of society of which it may be said that the necessary assumptions are valid. For instance, in his treatment of the psychical processes of social change, Tarde has recognised the necessary assimilation of social phenomena to all other phenomena dealt with by science, and has therefore limited his field, so as to include only a group of phenomena of which the essential characteristics are known and are constant. In this way he deals with

definable and knowable reactions to definable and knowable stimuli; and as the meeting of thing and stimulus is continually repeated, the discovery of the mode of reaction is a valuable addition to knowledge, and is also "prevision," in the scientific sense above stated. So too the physiological Sociologist, by limiting his field to certain known and probably permanent qualities in the social units, and the Economist, by limiting his field to certain known and simple desires working in an environment of which the essential characteristics may be taken as stable, are, each of them, able to formulate certain laws which bear directly upon future changes. But the point to note is that such laws and provisions are not at all what the general Sociologist has in view. They do not touch the *whole* situation, present or future; they tell us little more than some truths about the mechanism of future changes. It is one thing to know the mode by which causal ideas are propagated through the social medium; quite another thing to know what those causal ideas will be and in what kind of medium they will work. It is one thing to know what are the conditions of healthy re-production, or the determinants of the value of economic goods and efforts; quite another thing to know what will be the attitude of the next generation towards increase or decrease of this or that kind of quality in the population, or its estimate of the values of this or that kind of good and effort in relation to all other ingredients of social welfare. And, be it noted, the specialists referred to only reach results by rigid limitation of their subject-matter. The general Sociologist can make no such limitation.

In examining the latter's claims, it may be well to begin with the difficulty inherent in the unlimited nature of his subject-matter. The difficulty is not necessarily insuperable, on certain conditions to be discussed later; but it is serious enough to be worth noting. Unlike any other science, unlike even the special social sciences, general Sociology deals with a material not only infinitely complex, but also, by the terms of the investigation, incapable of any limitation whatsoever. The Sociologist who takes the whole social process as his field, cannot, like the Economist, artificially limit the phenomena with which he is concerned. He must deal with all the actual and possible elements of social life. He cannot even, like the politician and historian, discard everything insignificant and small, on some adaptation of the plea *de minimis non curat lex*. It is just because he sees importance in the infinitely little things of the present that he claims to be more scientific than the politician—just as he is superior to the historian, because, while the latter scavenges the dust heap of the past with an eye only to certain bright and conspicuous objects, or things of assumed importance, he, the Sociologist, finds importance in it all. Now I suppose no Sociologist can, in his heart, believe that the generalisations and

predictions, the warnings and promises, of either the ordinary historian or the politician are of any scientific value whatever. Their arguments and conclusions cannot be other than more or less plausible decorations of their own prejudices and hopes and fears, resulting from their biased selection of material. Cliffe Leslie was not merely joking when he urged that wherever the phrase "All history shows" occurs it should be altered into "I choose to take it for granted"; and we all do habitually make this alteration when we are dealing with the arguments and proofs of our political opponents. I know of course that this view can never be openly adopted; the great fiction of the value of historical and political generalisations must be maintained at all costs, for otherwise history would be too dull and the civilised world would lose much of its most stimulating occupation. And further, the fact that we are all generalisers and political arguers causes us to be instinctively supporters of the fiction. But a fiction it is, in spite of universal acceptance.

Now modern Sociology is plainly a protest against the myopia of history and politics; but, as a consequence, it is committed to the task of sifting out a material unmanageable and infinite in its complexity and changing infinitely at every moment. We are told by Dr. Small that the first duty of the Sociologist will be to state the whole social situation at each moment. He gives a preliminary schedule of the categories to be considered; his list (a most imperfect one) contains about 260 such categories, ranging in importance from breakfast foods, dress-reform, and the weather, to philosophy, Chautauquas, and clergymen. The problem of understanding the social situation is the problem of obtaining a true conspectus of all these data in their bearing upon individual and social welfare at the present moment. After that, Social Technology will begin!

Of course this difficulty—the infinity of the data—is too obvious to be laboured. It has always been admitted, as it was by Comte; and it is not insuperable, if one condition is fulfilled. Scientific treatment and prevision, and therefore an ultimate technology, are still possible, provided that we can assume that certain factors or elements are both constant and of dominating importance. This is indeed the assumption made by Comte; it is also the assumption by which the abstractions of all special social sciences and special branches of Sociology are justified. The Economist or the Economic Sociologist assumes the constancy and dominance of certain wants in the human agents and certain pressures or resistances in the environment; the Eugenist and the physiological Sociologist assume the constancy and dominance of certain factors of heredity and assimilation. It is only necessary then for the general Sociologist to define the full number of factors which he assumes to be both constant and dominant. In this way he may

be able to present, in a statement of causes and effects, the connection between what is essential in the social past and present with what is essential and necessary in the social future.

But here we are brought face to face with the real difficulties. The factors or elements which we wish to define as the operative forces of social change are for the most part unknown and unknowable; the subjects or social units in and through whom these forces work are an unknowable material, both as originators of the forces and as re-agents to them; and the environment in which forces and re-agents operate is also unknowable in a way which differentiates it from all other environments.

For the factors and materials of social change form always a complex, of which part indeed consists in predetermining objective conditions and forces (which may be known), but part also in forces of an entirely unique kind, which we may describe provisionally as purposes, ends, ideals, or impulses (individual and collective) towards an imagined future. Now the former part of this complex may be and sometimes is of the requisite character—knowable, definable, and constant in its action; for it consists on the one hand of environmental pressures, on the other hand of internal or subjective responses, or internal and subjective pressures (such as certain felt needs) which are always normally operative, and often even measurable. So far the subject-matter is on a par with that of the physical and biological sciences. And further, it may be admitted that in very simple or early states of social human life the environmental pressures may be regarded as dominant factors of a definable kind, while the other subjective forces are little more than impulses which may be viewed as organic responses to these pressures. And as a consequence some valid generalisations of cause and effect may probably be formulated of the whole course of social development in the simpler stages. But as the social process advances, the situation changes entirely. With the increasing dominance of mind (to use Professor Hobhouse's phrase), the other part of the complex becomes increasingly operative. Instead of known pressures followed by normal responses, we have, as the chief determinants of change, impulses and purposes determined by an ideal end or aim, whose action on the social units is in turn determined by each one's whole mental state; and further, the environmental pressures are themselves transformed, not merely in the sense that progressive man tends more and more to make his own environment, but in the far subtler sense that the whole environment tends to become relative to the content of the ideal end or ends. What I mean is this: not only are the various impulses, desires, purposes and aspirations by which society is moved obviously relative to the ideal future presented, but also the conception of that ideal future at once alters the significance of

many of the elements in the existing (as well as in the future) environment, in ways to which I refer in a moment.*

Now the ends and purposes to which the whole social process is relative are necessarily unknown and unknowable, whether we regard them as those of individual units or of the social group. Though we are always vaguely defining them to ourselves, we know that they are really indefinable, for they are determined moment by moment, not by reason nor by intelligence, but by the life-impulse of the whole society. They are themselves the outcome of this impulse, though continually re-acting upon it and apparently guiding it. Even the champions of a prescient and directive Sociology seem to admit this indefinability. What is the goal of the social process, we ask, either ultimately or immediately? Their answer is—"More of the social process,"—nothing more definite than that. Neither the next step in the process nor the kind of process can be stated. Can we then assume some continuity of direction and of quality in the process? This of course is what we actually do whenever we formulate social "laws" or even a social policy; but quite without justification. It is really an old-fashioned device which will soon be discredited. In the modern sciences which deal with life (perhaps in the physical sciences too) the most significant change is the admission, grudgingly and timorously made, of an unexpected spontaneity in everything, from the atom up—a basis for revolutionary views of variation and development. So, too, the Psychologist knows that each individual is a centre of unnumbered and unknown possibilities, most of which are normally shut away by selection at the bidding of tradition. But the universal increase of purposive reflection—that great solvent of tradition—is continually opening the door to these possibilities; and the unfettered spontaneity of many of the vital atoms of society is beginning to be unpleasantly felt. There is therefore now and for the future much more need to assume discontinuity than continuity of direction in the social process.

Of the three difficulties upon which I am here insisting—the unknowability of the most important (ideal) forces, the indefinability of the essential environment, and the incalculable spontaneity of the subjects or units in whom the ideal forces originate and upon whom they work,—the last-named has already been fully stated by Mr. H. G. Wells, who maintains that the increasing importance of the "instance," as one passes from mechanics and physics through biology to economics and sociology, profoundly

* Compare Albert Fouillée: "In the science of society, the fact of consciousness entails a reaction of the whole assemblage of social phenomena upon themselves, such as the natural sciences have no example of." And, "Sociology ought to guard carefully against the tendency . . . to consider as given fact or dead data that which creates itself and gives itself into the world of phenomena continually by force of its own conception."

affects the methods of study in each science, and vitiates the usual scientific procedure of measurement, classification, etc., when applied to social units. It is to be noted that the retort of the Comtist—that we can and do classify individuals and groups, and generalise about them quite safely—is not to the point. Of course we can rightly predicate numerous identical characteristics of all human beings, or all of a given group or class, and so far we can deal with them scientifically (as the statistician does) just in the same way as the Physicist deals with atoms or masses and the Biologist with corpuscles and animals. But the point to notice is that, whereas the classifications and generalisations of the latter include those qualities of the units which are of essential significance in relation to the causal processes considered, the classifications and generalisations of the Sociologist do not and cannot include many of the qualities of the human units which are of essential significance in relation to social changes. Let us by all means grant that social human beings can be classified according to *some* definite characteristics of importance. The Eugenist can classify us according to certain defined life-values,—vigour and strength of definite kinds; and the Economist can classify us according to certain definite capacities,—abilities to produce material wealth of definite kinds. These qualities are significant in relation to the particular ends so defined. But both qualities and ends are relative to the general social aim or purpose which may be dominant at any time, and the approximation to which is regarded as progress. The definite qualities by which we can be classified are *not* the important and significant ones in relation to the attainment of the indefinable “good end” towards which society is always feeling its way. This “good end” may always include health and wealth,—but qualified in innumerable unforeseen ways, never as independent, permanent, clearly defined ends in themselves, and never in a position of fixed importance. And the qualities which are significant and important in relation to the moving ideal of society—and which actually determine that ideal—are not capable of definition, nor are the individual units capable of classification according to those qualities. For they include elements of changing feeling, attitude, idea, will, and moral character, in which every individual is unique. His conception of an ideal future, his valuation of the present situation (together with his mode of reacting to any suggested conception) are his and his alone; they are also continually changing, and they are unknown, not only to others, but for the most part to himself. This is the essential individuality which really defies scientific treatment; but these elements in it are the ones of which the importance is really paramount. And prevision of change based upon generalisations in respect to these are on a par with the

predictions of a party agent at election time. They may be right; but they are not scientific.

It is necessary to guard against another objection. When we speak of the dominance of purpose related to ideal ends, our language may seem to imply that social change is after all rational, or rationally determined. In speaking of determining purposes we must surely mean those systems or schemes of ideas which our *reason* elaborates as a system of means and ends; and though there is doubtless a continual struggle going on in society between competing systems, it must be a struggle between rational systems, not between blind forces; and the most rational system—that which the philosopher has worked out—will at any moment be nearest to the truth, and will win the day in proportion as society is reasonable. Any such inference is, I believe, wholly unwarranted; it is the outcome of the illusory belief in the rationality of human progress which vitiated so much of the thought of the last century. No life-movements in society are ever rational, in the sense of being determined by reason; they spring from the products of mental functioning which are below (or above) the rational. They are impulsive; no other word describes them; and they are the result of the totality of individual and social life-impulses surging up at any moment. What Mr. G. B. Shaw has said of great political movements is true of all social movements: "the unconscious self of mankind breaks its way through the problem as an elephant breaks through a jungle." Undoubtedly we present these impulses to ourselves and to others in the form of reasoned arguments and conclusions; but our schemes of carefully connected and argued means and ends are really little more than the rational dress of impulse. They are valuable, indeed, just in proportion to the care with which they are elaborated, since at each step they react upon the impulse by connecting it more closely with the content of the existing situation. But the solution of the situation is not thereby converted into a rational process. And once again it must be remembered that this reaction of reasoned scheme upon impulse actually increases the unknowability of the future. It leads to a perpetual shifting of *values*, which in turn modifies the power or direction of the forces at work in the environment and in us. This is the consideration which vitiates many dogmatic conclusions of the Economist and the Eugenist. They assume certain values to be absolute and complete which are really relative and partial. They ask us to accept as fixed certain ends—wealth or health as defined by them—which, however, can only have a changing and not a fixed place in the ever-changing system of values in which the ideal scheme of society's purpose finds expression. And the general Sociologist is even less justified in any positive assertion of future values. He cannot say that this or that valuation will

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be adopted, any more than he can say that this or that combination of purposes or ideal forces will be at work.

If these views are correct, then the pretensions of the general Sociologist fall to the ground. He can never hope by analysis of the whole present situation to elicit causal tendencies which will or must or should hold good of the whole social process of the future. For this social situation (the initial subject-matter of the ^{would-be} science) consists at any moment of the following elements:—

(1) Certain environmental pressures and certain subjective responses and vital impulses which may be known and treated scientifically on the same lines as the material of other sciences.

(2) Subjective forces and tendencies to re-action, which, either in the individuals or as resulting collective forces and tendencies, are necessarily unknown, since they are determined, from moment to moment, by ideal changes dependent on the whole present and future experience of all the individuals.

(3) An environment which is not objective, but dependent for its significance (that is, its influence as a factor of change), on the subjective states and ideal ends and imaginations of all the units of society.

(4) Subjects or units which defy classification in so far as their essential and significant qualities are neither stable nor definable.

Of these four components of the existing situation, three at any rate elude the grasp of the Sociologist. And, be it added, in trying to grasp them, he is himself the victim of all his own individual biases and interests. Each one of us approaches the existing situation or any suggested change through the medium of that scheme of values which his own individual place and life and feeling have built up in him; and our valuations are not more likely to be right than those of the party politician—and are probably not so well up to date. We may insist that we have discovered a body of first principles, or fundamental laws of social development, on which all progress must be based. There can be no such principles; or rather, of the principles propounded those only are valid which are also rather valueless, since their applicability like their proof belongs to the past. The so-called guiding principles and argued conclusions,—the elaborate outcome of our own impulses in response to our own imagined environment,—are on the same level with those of the Economist or Eugenist when he pretends to settle any concrete vital question such as fiscal reform or the improvement of the family; and the elephantine movements of the Great Being will continue to break through and trample upon principles and conclusions alike.

There is one general objection to be met. It may be said that I have been dealing only with "those modifications of society which are brought about by the social will," and which "do not come

within the purview of the social theorist" (E. A. Ross). It is difficult to see how any such distinction is possible. Comte was surely right when he linked social dynamics with progress in general. And by their own admission, the social theorists who attempt to make a science of social dynamics, whether they belong to the developmental school or the newer change-by-stimulus school, must both admit qualitative changes due to causal ideas. And these causal ideas are (again by their own admissions) only to be compared to unknown bits of ferment cast into a very partially known plasm. We may, if we choose, say that the ferment or causal idea originates in some combination of already existing feelings or desires in contact with the existing situation. Even if this were a complete statement of its origin, the nature of the ferment would still be beyond our power of scientific prevision, for the reasons I have indicated,—the infinity of possible factors, the baffling spontaneity of those factors, and the fact that many of them have never yet been brought into operation (and are therefore unknown in their possible tendencies) owing to the repressive influence of social tradition and education. But the statement of the origin of the ferment is not a complete one. It cannot be explained merely by reference to past and present conditions, for its existence is also determined in every mind by the ideal future to which all social ideas are relative.

The same holds true of the plasm into which the ferment is cast. We are perhaps on firmer ground in saying that the plasm—by which we must mean the whole consciousness and subconsciousness of the Social Being—is merely the resultant of past and present conditionings, which are theoretically capable of exhaustive analysis; but then once more it must be remembered that the peculiar quality of the plasm, in virtue of which it will or will not respond, in any one of many possible ways, to the ferment thrown in, cannot be known until the experiment is tried. Assuming this or that causal idea, and assuming the social consciousness to be just what our analysis presents it as being, can the resulting change be known? By a happy guess, possibly; by science, not at all; for all social responses are impulses, and the impulse is always new.

If the validity of these criticisms is even partially admitted, it is clear that we must modify our conception of a scientific general Sociology. Is its function, then, to be merely that of affording a more complete and more trustworthy interpretation of the past and present than history has been able to give, while leaving the future severely alone? Such limitation of its possibilities will probably satisfy no one; yet I am inclined to think that the chief defect of the statement lies in the word "merely." It is difficult to escape from the conviction that each form of social science

appears and is elaborated in response to a new social impulse demanding a new interpretation of itself and a justification of its own tendencies. This has been obviously the case with most accepted methods and systems of political speculation. It is also the only satisfactory view one can take of a great part of the rather pretentious science of Economics; a new industrial impulse—caused by and causing an industrial revolution—demanded and still demands a detailed interpretation of its own processes, as well as a progressive justification of them. So too Sociology may be viewed as the necessary response to the democratic impulse, and at its bidding is trying to make intelligible both the needs and the processes of the many-sided, expanding life of society in contact with the new situations which it itself creates. This is not to say that Sociology merely democratises history, and emphasises the part played by every factor in the social whole. It has a very vital function also in reference to the future, for its real task is to make more intelligible, and therefore more complete, the contact with present reality on the part of the life-impulse of society. In this way it can and will do very much more perfectly what has been badly done by historical generalisation, and is always being superficially done by political and practical social argument,—that is to say, expose as fully as may be some elements in the existing situation, and the relation of any suggested future to our existing and known systems of values based upon our past experiences, in order that the social choice may follow from as complete a touch with reality as is possible. But to map out the future, even in outline, is beyond its scope,—just as much as it is beyond the scope of Politics, Economics, or Eugenics, however much these may love to do so. Dogmatic assertions relating to the course of human progress, whether in the form of laws of developmental stages, or of fixed principles of social welfare, are exposed to the danger—from which the laws and principles of true science are exempt—of becoming meaningless and inapplicable or actually false as the significance of the social situation changes. The limit of the task of any social science is to prepare the problems for decision, as one may prepare ground for an unknown seed; the decision resting always and only, not with reason or intelligence, but with the combination of unknown forces which together make up the life-impulse of society.

The position I have put forward may be presented in a simpler form thus:—Social progress, or the future of the social process, can never be defined. As society becomes increasingly reflective, its purposes or aims become the dominant factors of social change. But this does not mean that progress becomes rational or intelligent. Social purposes may be elaborately expressed in the form of thought-out systems of ideal ends and means; but the direction

of the purpose and the quality of the ends are decided by the non-rational forces which may most safely be called impulses. These deciding factors are what they are at any moment in consequence of the contact of the whole social consciousness and sub-consciousness with the whole existing environment, of which the value or significance is determined by the existing scheme of desires, purposes, aims and aspirations; but the decisions which result from such contact can never be known until they are made, and can never be brought under any law or generalisation which is more than verbal. When the social plasm is in a state of ferment, the changes that take place are due to an infinity of causes most of which are unknown and unsuspected. The expression of the impulse to change in the form of a rational scheme of purposes does not make the change rational.

In the process of change, the content of the whole social ideal is modified; the significance of the different elements of social welfare is altered, and the valuation of "goods" is changed slightly or greatly. Given a more or less fixed significance of elements and a constant valuation of "goods," prevision of the direction of change might be possible within limits, and certain special social sciences might lay down the lines of necessary change; but this fixity and constancy are far less than is usually supposed. The true function of all social science is to make clear the existing situation (in the light of past and present) in order that the contact with present realities on the part of the social consciousness may be as complete as possible. This is the justification of all social argument, which is valuable in proportion as it is based on a more or less full view of the past and the present. And the final function of Sociology may be defined as the function of analysing and presenting the existing situation in as complete a form as possible, and connecting any proposed future with the known schemes of purposes and values now in existence, without passing any judgment as to the right or safest or most probable future movements.

E. J. URWICK.

DISCUSSION.

INTER-RACIAL RELATIONS.

WITH the main conclusion of Professor Caldecott I am in entire agreement. We desire the unity and the harmonious association of mankind, but what practical experience I have had in Africa and in Asia leads me to the same conclusion which Professor Caldecott has reached that that unity and that harmony will be attained not so much by fusion and inter-marriage as by "definitely organised co-operation"; by each being left free to develop his own individuality or assisted in that development, and by the individuals each with his own especial individuality definitely co-operating with one another for common humanity. Cosmopolitans and half-breeds with mere smudges of individuality command respect from few and do little towards promoting attachment. It is the man who is himself, the individual who shows individuality, the nation which believes in itself, that commands respect and incites attachment. I have noticed in India, and as it is in India with the Englishman so probably is it elsewhere with Russians, Frenchmen and others, that it is the Englishman who remains an Englishman whom the Indians respect and become most attached to, and that it is the Indian who retains his Indian individuality with all its grace and dignity whom Englishmen like best. The half-breeds, or the Englishmen who have become Indianised, and the Indians who have become Anglicised do not, contrary to what might have been expected, tend to bring the races together. If anything, I should say they tended to separate them. Perhaps we unwittingly recognise this when we fill the highest posts in India not with Englishmen who have spent their lives in India, but with Englishmen fresh from England. And certain is it that it is the "old fashioned," the thoroughly native, Indians whom Europeans really prefer.

This point is worth the attention of Sociologists, for its non-recognition has led some into serious error. Herbert Spencer, for instance, believed that the British could not have any lasting hold on India because they did not settle there and inter-marry. But, in my view, it is because we do not settle and inter-marry that our hold, and our influence when a hold is no longer requisite, is most likely to be lasting. It seems to me that it is because we go out young and fresh, remaining there only in the prime of life, retaining our individuality, retaining our character, and retaining our ideals

that we are able to exercise an influence which has some chance of lasting.

This leads me to a question to which Professor Caldecott has referred—the anxiety there is in some quarters lest the administrative tutelage of one race by another should be detrimental to the higher life of both. Perhaps it is necessary to live amongst and to have had practical dealings with peoples of various types—with pure barbarians and with the half-civilised, to get it stamped into one's mind that all men are not equal and never will be equal. As Professor Caldecott has shown there are grades of humanity, and apparently there always will be grades. The time when men were most nearly equal was when they were all primitive barbarians a quarter of a million years ago. Ever since then they have been becoming more and more unequal, and the evidence is not only that there are grades but that those grades are increasing and steepening. Not only is the Hottentot not equal to the Frenchman but the distance between them is likely to increase: it was less great a thousand years ago than it is now and it seems a fair inference that it is less now than it will be a thousand years hence.

We may fairly assume that nations will always remain on different grades. This being so, and the earth's area being limited, it is obvious that certain border races must inevitably come under the control, the protection, the administrative tutelage of certain higher races. The less-gifted Mongolians, Turkis and Tibetans are under the protection and tutelage of the more highly-civilised Chinese. The aboriginal tribes of India come under the tutelage of Hindu Chiefs and these again under British protection. We still retain an uncomfortable feeling that there is something wrong in exercising such tutelage—something unjust, high-handed and oppressive. We still retain the false idea of the equality of all men and feel half guilty in assuming a position of superiority. But it seems to me far more reasonable for the higher nations to regard themselves as possessing a high and important trust for common humanity to protect and guide and inspire the lower races. For let us look facts in the face. Even in the present generation Siberia and Manchuria have been threaded by a railway. Peking has been brought within seventeen days of Paris and London. Central Asia has been pacified. Order has been brought into the midst of Africa, and its deepest depths have been made accessible. Egypt, Tunis and Algiers have been restored to prosperity. And in many other directions the control and guidance by one or other of the powerful higher nations has worked not only for the good of that nation, and not only for the benefit of the less-developed race which has been brought under its administrative tutelage, but also—and this is the point—to the advantage of *all* nations, for the good of mankind as a *whole*.

Common humanity benefits where the administrative tutelage has been judiciously and humanely exercised. Every nation benefits by the presence of the Russians in Siberia and Central Asia, of the Chinese in Mongolia and Turkestan, of the British in India, Egypt and Central and Southern Africa, and of the French in Tunis and Algeria. Neither the Asiatics, Africans nor Europeans would benefit by Russia, England and France declaring that all men were equal and retiring from their task of administrative tutelage. Protection, guidance, and tutelage of the weak by the strong, of the lower by the higher are, to my mind, an essential part of human development.

Yet, while I see the necessity for this tutelage, I also recognise that the proper way of exercising it has not yet been worked out by a single one of the higher nations. All of them are either too indifferent, or too clumsy, or too fitful and undecided. And the practical point to which energy will have in future to be directed is how to effect that tutelage without emasculating the protected people. The aim will be to develop individuality. And how to preserve order without crushing individuality is the great administrative problem of to-day. The French and the Italians with their refined taste and delicacy of touch possess advantages in which the harder and in some respect clumsier nations of the North are lacking. But they are often wanting in persistency and purposefulness, and do not get that support from the mother-country which the Englishman, in spite of his diatribes against interference from Downing Street, does receive in a far greater degree than any one else except, perhaps, the Russian.

If I might be permitted to offer a hint as to the solution of this most delicate and intricate problem I should say that it lay along the lines which Professor Caldecott has indicated—that is to say, not along the lines of fusion and inter-marriage but along the lines of organised co-operation, or in English, of working together. Let us imagine the higher nations freed of the last shred of doubt as to the necessity and more than necessity, the duty and obligation of guiding and controlling lower and less fortunate races. Let us imagine them throwing their whole heart into the work, not jealously distrustful of one another's intentions, but whole-heartedly co-operating with one another in the conviction that each is the gainer by the good work of the other, and that the work done is for the good of all humanity. And let us imagine further that to carry out their intentions they have evolved agents with all the warm sympathy of the Irishman, the delicacy, the method and the imagination of the Frenchman, and the self-reliance and long-persistency of the Englishman. Then we may catch a glimpse of the ideal method by which administrative tutelage may bring forth, foster and develop all the individuality in the lower race, and raise

the higher races still higher by exercising them in sympathy and by convincing them that they are daily contributing to that drawing together and uplifting of common humanity which must be the highest aim of every individual and of every nation.

It is naturally easier for a nation to ignore this obligation. The tutelage of less-favoured people is a difficult and often thankless task. It is a drain on the manhood of the controlling nation. Many of her ablest sons are drained away from the mother-country and are not available for her own development. Often the work has to be carried on in an uncongenial climate where the physique suffers. Often again home ties are strained and domestic happiness is sacrificed. And at all times it is difficult to adjust the political ideals of the mother-country to the administrative needs of the protected people. It is for this reason that so many Americans shrink from protectorates in Cuba, the Phillipines or elsewhere. They want to concern themselves only with their own purely domestic democratic ideals and wish to be perfectly free from any of the obligations which the administrative tutelage of other peoples implies. And such reluctance to be concerned with any one else's affairs than their own, and such repugnance to anything which savours of domination and suppression is easily intelligible. Nevertheless there is a point of view, the one which I have indicated above, from which such abnegation may appear more like refined and fastidious selfishness than like high-souled generosity, and may be less really humane than the action of another who believes that for the good of humanity as a whole it is essential that the more advanced nations should take the more backward in hand in much the same way as the higher classes in a nation do not shut themselves off from and ignore the lower classes, but deliberately and in the interests of the whole nation take them in hand and fit them more and more for the exercise of responsibility.

Moreover those who have doubts as to the rights or advantages of one race controlling another may take this further point into consideration, that there are peoples who flourish best and who can most effectively develop their especial individuality when they are under the protection of a stronger, more practical race, who will do the, as it were, 'dirty' work of governing for them. There are peoples whose minds are more particularly directed to spiritual matters, who develop better when relieved of the necessity of governing and protecting themselves. The Tibetans *prefer* being under some strong temporal power, whom they think they will influence spiritually while they themselves receive adequate protection. And the Jews, though they did not come under Roman protection as a matter of choice, nevertheless, did, when under that protection, make their greatest contribution to the welfare of mankind, for it was then that Christianity arose.

And now turning from a consideration of the relations of the higher to the lower races to the consideration of the relations of the higher races to one another, I think we shall see at work the same principle of the individualisation of individuals and the co-operation of these developing individuals. It is true the increase of armaments seems to tell against co-operation, and like Professor Caldecott, we must all regret that the great expenditure on armaments is still necessary. But there is little use in being impatient. We have to remember the extreme youthfulness of man. We cannot expect maturity to arrive prematurely. Man is only a quarter of a million years old. He is not yet grown up. His civilisation, and especially western civilisation, is very recent. It has not yet sunk into him. It has not yet reached the marrow of his bones. It is still a veneer. Maybe the stern realities of war may for many hundreds or thousands of years yet be necessary for both the hardening and stiffening of what is soft, and the softening and flexing of what is hard. Such periods, long as they seem to us, are small to the geologist with whom the sociologist must necessarily at times bring himself into relation. And if this long continuance of war seems to the humane a brutal thought they may console themselves with this consideration, that the individuals and the nations who have fought the hardest are not the most cruel and harsh but are often the most humane. This is another of those facts of practical experience which fly in the face of what might have been expected on untested theory, and it is worthy of attention. Our hardest fighting soldiers and sailors have been the most kindly and gentle of men in ordinary life; and I should be surprised to hear that Mr. Stead was any more humane in common life than Lord Roberts. It is not seldom the case that the politicians exact harder terms at the conclusion of a campaign than do the soldiers. Soldiers and sailors of rival nations fraternise more readily than any other class. And the nations who have fought hardest and struggled most strenuously have the broadest and most generous sympathy with the lower races. No peoples have fought harder against each other and against other people than the French and the English. Yet no one would say that they were less kindly to lower races than the Belgians. We have some justification, therefore, for concluding that the strain and hardship of war and preparation for war are not all evil, and that with so much evil that war undoubtedly brings, it has also a bracing effect on races and not infrequently a broadening and softening effect on individual character.

And reviewing the progress of warfare as a whole we do see a slowly developing spiritualisation of hostility. The rough tribesman of the Indian frontier immediately he becomes stronger than his neighbour hits him over the head as a matter of course and

without a qualm. When he has a man down he hits him hard. When that man has no friends he hits him harder still. The Afghans, when the Japanese had defeated the Russians, thought that was obviously the time to attack the latter in Central Asia. Or, again, if his neighbour shows signs of getting as strong as himself the Afghan attacks him remorselessly before he can develop his strength. If an Afghan cabinet were sitting in Downing Street at the present time it would immediately despatch the Fleet to destroy the German navy now at once before it had time to become strong. Upon all such primitive procedure some measure of advance has been made by the higher nations. An international code of ethics is gradually evolving. Pure and obvious aggression is becoming more and more impossible. The occasions for war are being slowly reduced in number. The sphere of its operation is being more and more circumscribed. International opinion is more effectively brought to bear to prevent unnecessary and uncalled-for hostilities. And what appears to be necessary in practice is to continue in the future on the same lines of more and more spiritualising hostility, removing as far as possible all that can embitter war and seeking to render it, when inevitable, a fair and square stand-up fight: recognising hostility as a necessary accompaniment of human development for many a long stage yet; but recognising also that behind it are forces tending to co-operation and cohesion which are destined eventually to supersede it and finally prevail—maybe when all nations and all individuals have fallen into their appropriate places, and are led by one man, who, in his turn, only leads because, by so doing, he enables each to express his own particular individuality to the full, in much the same way as the conductor of an orchestra controls the whole and thus enables each, while fulfilling his own especial part, to unite with all the others in producing a single perfect harmony.

FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

THE POOR LAW Reform movement seems to hang fire. It is nearly a year since the Commissioners published their reports; but the prospect of decisive action is more remote than it seemed six months ago.

**Poor Law
Reform.**

This is only partly due to the development of political events. These have certainly conspired to push some urgent questions of social reform into political backwaters; but other causes, of a more complex and perhaps more permanent nature, have also been at work. What these causes are may best be made clear by a comparison of the present position with that of the year 1834, when the last great reform was made in our system of public relief. In that year, a very important and necessary change, of a simple and intelligible kind, was unanimously recommended by the three Commissioners who had been appointed two years previously. The Parliament which had appointed them was eagerly waiting to act upon their recommendation. There was plenty of opposition in the country at large, but this was unorganised, confused, and incoherent,—strong in words but not in action, maledictory and venomous, but not effective nor convincing. The result was that the new scheme was embodied in law without any delay. The present situation is totally different. We have an equally important reform proposed, but it is of a complex and difficult kind, designed, not to stop a single outstanding evil, but to mitigate a hundred evils; based, not upon one or two intelligible principles, but upon a scheme of principles which even its advocates find a difficulty in explaining clearly. The Commissioners are not unanimous: a small but strong minority is totally opposed in policy and in principle to the majority. Parliament is pre-occupied, and likely to remain so for the present. And, finally, there has appeared in the country a double opposition to the proposed reforms which is not merely maledictory, but also strong with the strength which belongs to a united officialdom on the one hand, and to a fixed and uncompromising social theory on the other.

Now there is reason to think that this last difference is likely to be the most important in its results. The other differences indicate causes of delay, but would not of themselves weaken the zeal of the reformers. The division of the Commissioners into two parties is a source of vigour to each party. Even the Majority has been goaded into organising a "campaign" by the example of energy set by the Minority. The complexity of the principles involved on each side is also an invigorating factor,—provided only the principles are, in each case, capable of being harmonised into a coherent system. We do not expect social policies to be as simple to-day as they could be seventy-six years ago: sociological analysis has made it necessary that proposals for reform, if they

are to be even plausible, shall raise many issues and ramify into many departments of our complex social process.

So far, then, there is nothing to prevent the propaganda of Poor Law reform going forward with increasing vigour to the goal of a radical change. But this is not what is happening, at any rate with regard to the proposals of the Majority of the Commissioners. These were presented to the country last year as a clear and confident statement of a complete, workable, and carefully planned scheme of reform. The condition of things which they are designed to remedy has not changed at all; but the originators of the proposals seem to have lost much of their confidence. It is hardly too much to say that they give the impression of being a little afraid of their own scheme; and this fear has a paralysing effect upon them. To what is it due? To the vehemence of the opposition shown by most Poor Law officers and many existing Guardians? But surely they must have expected this opposition, when they condemned the existing system. It is, of course, one of the difficulties in the situation to-day that there has arisen since 1834 a very large and united official class whose members have taken up the Poor Law service as their life's work, and who have also, in the great majority of cases, the right to call themselves devoted and zealous servants of the system which they administer. The Guardians have less claim to consideration; but it is only human on their part to object to their own abolition. From both these quarters strong opposition was a foregone conclusion, and can hardly come as a surprise to the Commissioners. But in a different quarter equally determined opponents have arisen, whose antagonism could not have been so easily foreseen; and it is this which appears to have disconcerted the Majority. For it is from their own friends,—from the staunchest supporters of their general policy,—that the disagreement comes. Many of the leading advocates of strict and deterrent administration of relief have refused to follow the Commissioners in their far-reaching scheme for more elaborate assistance and treatment of the "necessitous." They see in it many dangerous tendencies, many openings for the very abuses which the inheritors of the principles of 1834 have always striven to hold at bay. They have therefore refused to support the recommendations of the Majority, and have become detractors and critics instead of allies.

This unexpected opposition has put the Majority in a dilemma. They found themselves faced with two alternatives: either to throw over their former friends and push their scheme wholeheartedly, or to discard the scheme as a whole and so win back their allies. The former alternative,—the resolute course which confidence would surely have chosen,—has not been adopted. But neither has the latter. The most that can be said is that the course of action taken suggests an unstable compromise. The Majority have formed an association for the reform of the Poor Law,—presumably upon the lines of their proposed scheme,—and have at the same time given prominent places on the Council to the friends who are also keen critics of the scheme.

From every point of view this is an unfortunate course to have taken. It is perfectly true that, as Mr. C. S. Loch has remarked

in his letters to the *Morning Post*, the country requires time to consider the issues involved, and in the meanwhile requires enlightenment as to those issues. But the obscuring of issues enlightens no one; if the country is to appreciate the value of the Majority's scheme of reform, it surely needs to have that scheme presented to it as a coherent whole, and not as a patchwork of proposals, some of which are good, some doubtful, and some too dangerous to be accepted by its own supporters.

Two of the volumes of evidence recently issued by the Poor Law Commission deserve special notice. Volume XII contains four memoranda by individual Commissioners. The first is a short note by Mr. Loch on the Poor Law history from 1601 to 1834; the second is a much longer memorandum by Professor Smart on the period from 1832 to 1876; the third is a very full account by Mrs. Sidney Webb on Poor Law Policy since 1834; and the fourth is a statistical statement by Mr. Charles Booth. Of these, the second and third are specially interesting and valuable. Dr. Smart's account of the Commission of 1832 and the "1834 principles" brings out most clearly the fact that the famous Report was really intended to establish a "fundamental principle" as regards relief of the able-bodied, and the able-bodied alone; and that, in regard to the relief of all other kinds of destitute persons, the guidance it affords is chiefly negative and only very partially thought out. The Commissioners of that time were simply not interested in most of the problems of relief and treatment which occupy us to-day. The care of children, for instance, is hardly dealt with at all; and widows are practically forgotten!

Of Mrs. Webb's memorandum part has since been published in book form under the title "English Poor Law Policy." It is impossible in a short note to do more than indicate the contents. The memorandum deals fully both with the "Revolution of 1834" and with the subsequent history of administration down to 1907, treating at special length the history of medical relief—both under the Poor Law and under the Public Health Departments,—the history of Poor Law administration in Bradford since 1835 (a peculiarly interesting section), and the history of administration in Poplar since 1837. It is hardly necessary to add that Mrs. Webb brings out the contrast between 1834 and 1907 both clearly and skilfully, assigning their leading principles to each year: to 1834, the principles of National Uniformity, Less Eligibility, and the Workhouse System; to 1907, the principles of Curative Treatment, Universal Provision, and Compulsion.

MUCH more important is the evidence contained in Volume XXVIII, in which are given the reports of visits to Poor Law Institutions; for it is in this volume that we have to seek the justification of the Commission's verdict upon our present Poor Law System. Three general impressions are conveyed by the evidence: first, that the system is both badly and extravagantly administered; secondly, that the officials are not

The Commission's Evidence.

The Condemnation of the Poor Law System.

often to blame for this, but do their work as well as can reasonably be expected; and thirdly, that the Boards of Guardians *are* to blame, in very numerous cases. A few instances taken at random will show the kind of abuse which the Commissioners found repeated in many parts of the country. In one place "the whole condition of the Workhouse reflects great discredit on the Board of Guardians," "the detailed administration seeming so incompetent as to be almost cruel." No separate accommodation for the children had been provided,—because for years it had been a Party question at the Board! In another, "the whole of the institutions seemed to lack any real human feeling, everything being done to consider money first, and the real needs of the men, women, and children second." In another, "four bed-ridden cases were locked in one room along with an able-bodied imbecile." In another, the Master appointed to the supreme charge of the workhouse had formerly been a steward, and had had no experience in Poor Law work. In another, the cost of maintaining patients at the Sick Asylum works out at 33/- per bed per week,—a figure which "would be increased if calculated upon the average number of inmates"; and yet "the most trivial cases are sent here, even sore toes having been regarded as sufficient reason"! Instances of abuse and misuse of out-relief are almost too numerous to quote. They reveal an almost total absence of any intelligible scale or standard of adequacy. One Board is content to give 2/- a week to an old widow living alone who has to pay 2/6 rent; "there was no other known income"! Another Board had been giving 1/6 a week and one loaf to a widow living with a married son with two children earning: average earnings 41/5 per week! Yet the same Board considered 6/6 a week above rent a sufficient income for a widow with three young children.

Let it be admitted, however, that side by side with many instances of mismanagement there are found many examples of whole-hearted endeavour to do the best for the army of poor people whose only refuge is a Poor Law Institution. And yet the general impression given inclines one to agree with the Majority's opinion that the existing Boards of Guardians are not a success, and to doubt the wisdom of the Minority's desire, so strongly expressed in their report, to absolve the Guardians from blame, in order to lay the whole responsibility for failure upon the System itself.

SOCIOLOGICAL students are not much addicted to the study of statistics; nor are Blue Books often included in the lists of "books recommended for study." We wish an exception could be made in favour of the Abstract of Labour Statistics issued annually by the Board of Trade. It is doubtful whether any document published contains so much valuable Sociological information in so small a compass. In less than 300 octavo pages, it furnishes the details, not only of the earnings and occupations of the people, but of their consumption of food, their housing, their accidents and diseases, their thrift, their pauperism, and a host of other important matters such as Trade Unionism,

**Life and
Labour of
the People.**

Co-operation, Profit-Sharing, and labour disputes. The volume issued in February last (for the year 1907--1908) contains also numerous comparative tables relating to the industrial progress of the nation. A few facts of special interest may be quoted here. First, with regard to occupations, it is worth noting (though this particular information is not new) that in the last decade of the 19th century the proportion of boys and men at work increased, while the proportion of girls and women decreased, with the result that, in 1901, 8,370 males were working out of every 10,000 males over 10 years of age, as against 3,149 females out of every 10,000 females over 10 years of age. This movement in the direction of more male labour and less female labour should be borne in mind by the numerous people who maintain that unemployment is due to the ousting of men by women. It is also interesting to note that the increase of male workers (and most of the decrease of female workers) has taken place in the small industries of the country, that is, in industries employing less than 50 per 10,000 of the population.

The growth of material well-being is shown by the steady increase in the consumption of semi-necessaries. Since 1894 (and up to the year 1908) the consumption of cocoa has more than doubled, that of tea, coffee, and tobacco has risen very considerably. The consumption of beer and spirits, on the other hand, has hardly risen at all as compared with 15 years ago, and has fallen very considerably since the "high water mark" of the years 1899 to 1902. This fall in the consumption of intoxicants is often ascribed to the greater poverty of the mass of the people since 1902; but such an explanation is not quite in harmony with the much greater consumption of other forms of food and drink. It is true that the cost of living has risen to a not inconsiderable extent; and further, the consumption of meat has fallen a little since the very prosperous years of a decade ago. But, if all the facts are taken into account, we are forced to conclude that the nation is now drinking rather less, not because it cannot afford to drink more, but for other reasons; and among these other reasons must be counted some change of fashion or taste.

The change in retail prices of food shows a rise of 8.4 per cent. since 1900; the rise is considerably greater if comparison is made with the very cheap years 1895 and 1896. The workman is certainly not now getting as high a real wage as he did 10 or 15 years ago.

One of the most interesting tables is that relating to industrial accidents. Modern industry has often been taunted with its ruthless destruction of life; in the United States especially much use has been made of the bitter but true parody "Peace hath its victims as well as war." It is at any rate satisfactory to note that in this country the number of workers killed while at work shows a slight but fairly steady diminution during the past 10 years,—in spite of the greater numbers employed. It has fallen from 4,619 in 1899 to 4,154 in 1908. The fall is entirely due to the decrease of fatal accidents connected with shipping. Non-fatal accidents appear to increase steadily; but the figures for recent years cannot be compared with those of earlier years, owing to the increased care in

recording accidents since the Workmen's Compensation Act was passed.

The figures relating to schemes of Profit-Sharing have a peculiar interest, in view of the attractiveness of the principle. Very few people who advocate this method of industrial remuneration as a cure for many unfairnesses have any idea of the difficulties surrounding it. Since 1865, 198 Profit-Sharing schemes have been started by different firms. Of these, only 49 now survive, affecting only 63,403 workers out of an industrial population of over 18 millions. And the majority of these workers affected belong to two or three big firms,—notably in the gas and ship-building trades.

A DETAILED analysis of the weekly budgets of a number of very

**Family
Budgets.**

poor working-class families has recently been issued under the auspices of the Liverpool Statistical Society, under the title "How the Casual Labourer Lives." The budgets of forty families have been collected, over periods ranging from 2 to 62 weeks. Of these, 29 are the families of dock-labourers; this fact alone indicates the difficulties of the task of getting carefully kept accounts of the income and expenditure. It is not possible here even to summarise the results. The tables need to be carefully studied in each case. But the task has been well done, and the book is a very valuable addition to the scanty literature on the subject. It is always dangerous to generalise from such budgets about the "conundrum" of how the poor live. The personal factor, which counts for so much, cannot be shown in tables of expenditure. But light is thrown upon numerous incidental questions of great importance. For example, the immense importance of the part played by the pawnbroker and the money-lender in the lives of the very poor is perhaps (as the investigators admit) the fact most strongly brought out by the enquiry. It may be added that the extraordinary generosity of the poor to one another is also strongly illustrated. It may not seem a great thing for the parents of a family of six, with a total income of less than 20/- a week, to allow a poor neighbour to quarter herself upon them for most of her meals; but who does not feel ashamed when reading of a man and his wife, similarly burdened with six quite young children, actually taking *five* more into their care to relieve a widowed brother-in-law who was poorer than themselves? Truly, "to know what generosity and charity mean, one must look for them in the lives of the poor. It is scarcely possible for a rich man to be generous."

ONE turns with mixed feelings to the account given by Sir Henry Burdett, in his Annual Register of Charities, of the amount of the subscriptions and donations recorded for last year in the reports of all the charitable institutions and societies of the kingdom. These reached a total of over twelve million pounds,—a considerable increase over any former year. This increase, following a similar increase in the previous year, is adduced by Sir H. Burdett as strong evidence of the strength and sufficiency of the voluntary

system; and he points out with pride that the sum is equivalent to an average annual contribution of 27/- per family through the whole population. Without expressing any opinion upon the "voluntary system," one is inclined—when one thinks of the unmeasured charity of the poor—to marvel more at the smallness of the sum than at its greatness,—even though it does equal a contribution of 6½d. per week from every family. It should be remembered also that the sum includes not only many bequests and subscriptions to missions of various kinds, but also a very large number of contributions extracted from people by such peculiar methods as charity dinners and bazaars. Is it not perhaps time for us to stop praising ourselves for the munificence of our charitable gifts? The well-to-do section of the community gives away very much more than the sum published and quoted above; and its unrecorded gifts are probably more "charitable" than those which figure in annual reports. Even so, it is tolerably certain that our generosity is quite thrown into the shade by the matter-of-course generosity of the very poor to one another.

THE Chief Medical Officer of the Board of Education has at length issued his first annual report,—for the year 1908. **School Hygiene and the Care of Children.** It enables one to realise the very rapid growth of a movement which may reasonably be expected to improve enormously both the health of our population and the results of our system of education. Within one year of the passing of Mr. McKenna's Act of 1907, all but 21 of the 328 Local Educational areas in England and Wales were supplied with regular School Medical Officers. These numbered in all 1,084, of whom 8 were ladies; and there were in addition 60 lady assistant doctors. The very close connection between this School Medical Service and that of the Medical Officers of Health is shown by the fact that in 224 out of the 307 areas the School Medical Officer was also the Medical Officer of Health for the district.

Dr. Newman wisely refrains from much generalisation about the results of the first year's working of the system. Statistics as to the School Children's physical condition cannot be given until the examining doctors agree upon some uniform standard by which to tabulate results. In regard to one matter, however,—the condition of teeth,—it is possible to make some general statements, all of which are rather depressing. For it appears that 20 to 40 per cent. of the school children examined (excluding those in the babies' classes) have four or more decayed teeth; and this percentage is probably very much under the mark. In two districts where specially careful examination was made, far worse figures appear. In Cambridge the percentage of children with perfectly sound teeth had fallen to zero by the time the fourteenth year was reached.

The report emphasises strongly the need of the co-operation of School Managers and others in order that the results of medical examination may lead to efficient treatment. It is satisfactory, in this connection, to note that the London Care Committees, though very far from perfect, have recently given evidence of the serious-

ness with which their duties are regarded by issuing a monthly Journal entitled "The School Child," in which short and useful articles are published dealing with all the different departments of the many-sided work of an efficient Care Committee; while in reference to the medical care only, another journal, entitled "School Hygiene," has also made its appearance. Both these small journals deserve a welcome. The former is perhaps especially needed, in order to serve as a constant reminder that the duties of a member of a Care Committee are *not* confined to the care of the physical condition of the children.

E. J. U.

REVIEWS.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY.

PHASEN DER KULTUR UND RICHTUNGSLINIEN DES FORTSCHRITTS: SOZIOLOGISCHE UEBERBLICKE. Von Dr. F. Müller-Lyer. München: J. F. Lehmann's Verlag, 1908.

UNDER the modest title of "Phases of Culture and Lines of Progress," with the sub-title, "Sociological Surveys," Dr. F. Müller-Lyer has produced what perhaps deserves better than any other book to rank as a scientific introduction to sociology. Proceeding upon the large mass of modern German sociological inquiry, he reduces it with a quite remarkable success to unity of method and conception. From first to last he stands definitely at the scientific point of view; and this not merely negatively, by way of objection to fanciful constructions, but positively, by way of a consistently evolutionary handling of his problems. It would be hard to find in his whole work—which starts from culture-origins as determined by earth-history and proceeds through graded surveys of social and economic evolution to the problem of "Civilisation (*Kultur*) and Happiness"—essentially arbitrary hypotheses or conclusions such as Letourneau censures in Spencer, to say nothing of the dogmatism of Comte; and yet he is constantly concerned to indicate causation in evolutionary terms. The style is lucidity itself; and the character of the thinking is none the less penetrating, even if the philosophy as a whole be not water-tight. In point of appreciability it is thus a blessed contrast to the intellectual methods of Simmel, whose undeniable originality is furnished to his readers at such a burdensome cost of perplexed attention.

For Dr Müller-Lyer, man is, to start with, "the animal that talks," and has thereby become *par excellence* the progressive animal inasmuch as he progresses alike in knowledge and in reasoning. It is indeed not entirely warrantable to speak as our author does of all other animals as wholly non-progressive—each generation beginning exactly as did its predecessor. Progression has obviously taken place in the higher as compared with the lower animals; and progress of some kind in adaptation to environment must be taking place in some species, however hard it may be to measure. Before any recognisable attainment of cumulative speech, the fore-man had admittedly risen high in virtue of his hand—at once tool and tool-user. Concerning the hand, our author notes, in a luminous imaginative phrase, that it is "the gift of the tree"—a stroke of essential poetry which leaves him fully on his guard against the quasi-poetic generalisation that primitive tools and weapons are "projections of the organ," the hammer reproducing the fist, the tongs the teeth, and so on. That inadequate theorem is validly corrected by treating the tool as from the first an application of dawning reason; though here again the monkey that drops cocoa-nuts on rocks to break them, and the bird that similarly drops shells, must be recognised as moving on the same line. The residual truth is that *homo loquens* is the

key to *homo sapiens*, his speech being the greatest of all implements of progress. It made secure the "gift" of fire.

Of course our author holds to the truth, posited in the eighteenth century by Ferguson, that man's ancestors were always gregarious: not otherwise than in "groups" could speech have been evolved. And in the primordial phases of the "race-struggle" so-called, the more social groups, the better organised, would vanquish the less. But in recognising that speech was never "discovered," but gradually built up, our author gives the rectification of Geiger's over-statement that "before speech, man was reasonless," which he had needlessly endorsed as "entirely true." Humboldt's earlier antinomies: "Man is man by means of speech; but to discover speech he must be already man," is reduced to "complete truth" by Geiger's own statement that speech was not discovered but evolved—a proposition which dismisses his over-statement that there is no reason before speech. For the rest, our author duly notes the decisive pre-human point of departure in the descent of the climber from the tree to become hunter and fighter; though he does not discuss the interesting speculation that the descent may have been forced upon an arboreal species by the accidental burning of the forests in an island such as Java.

Taking the finding of fire as the "end of the *Urzeit*," Dr. Müller-Lyer proceeds with man as a definitely social animal, reaching all his gains through his sociability; and traces in turn the evolution of nutrition, tools, habitation, and clothing. All is envisaged as progress on the line of least resistance, with perhaps an insufficient employment of the conceptions of gifts of invention and survival of the fittest. The appearance of pottery, for instance, raises the question of *possibilities*, as when we find the polar Eskimos and the Australians alike unable or unconcerned to cook by boiling. The former seem limited alike by lack of plastic material and by the fabric of their houses from further developments of fire than lamp-burning: were the Australians the victims simply of lack of invention? On the evolution of hunting and fishing, lower and higher agriculture, animal domestication, foods, breads and cooking, Dr. Müller-Lyer is at once instructive and suggestive; and his tracing of the stages of industry from the primitive to the present "late-capitalistic phase of production" is no less helpful. On the economic evolution he is, if anything, disproportionately copious; and his book may be pronounced a successful vindication of the "materialistic" theory of history, even if it does not exhaust the valid applications of the principle. Probably the main opposition which the book will arouse will take the shape of a demand for a statement of the historic process in terms of other aspects of evolution.

Without methodically attempting such a criticism, one may indicate a few points at which Dr. Müller-Lyer's very able series of generalisations seems incomplete. On the one hand he assents to Peschel's finding that "what we understand by civilisation, culture, morals, is nothing else than a totality of shining thoughts, mainly inherited by us, and of Asiatic or Egyptian origin." On the other hand, in his concluding section on "Civilisation and Happiness," he comes to the conclusion that "civilisation has in general worsened rather than bettered the lot of the individual. This admittedly unwelcome verdict he justifies by saying that "progress in general has to do (*betraf*) not with the well-being of the individual, but solely and wholly with the development of society, and this at the cost of the individual." To say nothing of the impossibility of quadrating this with the summing-up of Peschel, one would ask, how can either the negative

or the positive proposition be substantiated? If progress has no relation to individual well-being, how can it be said to have worsened it? Is the worsening continuous from the primeval or pre-human stage? And by what means can sums of individual happiness in different phases of civilisation be either made or compared? Is the psychic well-being of the cave man any more comparable with that of the civilised man than with that of the hibernating bear?

If the scientific conception of progress is to leave individual happiness out of account, it would seem impossible to introduce into it a formula of individual worsenment. And the incoherence is not saved by suggesting, as does our author—after Lester Ward and others—that while progress has not promoted individual happiness in the past, it may do so in the future, when it is consciously controlled. If progress really consists, as our author has it, in the maximising of correlation and differentiation, either it has meant increased individual well-being thus far or it cannot be conceived to mean it in future. Alike the concrete ground for the pessimistic summary of past progress—the commonness of suffering among the civilised—and the handling of the abstract problem of comparative happiness, seem open to revision. There is plenty of sorrow among primitives. On the concrete side, however, Dr. Müller-Lyer is much to be commended for his outspoken declaration as to the “senseless populating” of the nineteenth century, and his insistence on the impossibility of controlling misery without controlling population. Here he is on his strongest ground—the study of the conditioning of economic movement.

One more difficulty obtrudes itself—that of the division of culture-epochs. Following up Kant's broadly sound generalisation—that successive culture-epochs tend to become shorter, by reason of accumulation of knowledge—Dr. Müller-Lyer writes that we may regard civilisation as progressing similarly with the development of the earth's crust: first, a relatively immense period of man-becoming; then a much shorter period of primeval savagery; a still shorter one of barbarism; and then ancient civilisation, 5000 years; mediæval civilisation, something over 1000 years; modern period 350; latest period, only 120. The objections to such a division are obvious. “Antiquity” too is subdivisible; and if, as seems inevitable, we recognise a quickening of pace in some if not all of its phases, we shall have to posit the sequence of a long and slow upon a short and quick phase. Our author subordinates the evolution of races and nations to that of civilisation in general; but if we conceive the following of a period of vigorous barbarism upon one of decadent civilisedness as a continuous “progress” we shall have to say the same thing of the decadence itself. It would seem necessary to bring our notion of “progress” frankly back to a confessedly subjective form, in which case we may see reason to modify the doctrine that all progress in civilisation is progress in socialisation. But no such revision of his philosophic forms can deprive the work of Dr. Müller-Lyer of its title to the highest praise for scientific breadth of view, interest, instructiveness, and suggestiveness. It is a really great service to sociology, “the youngest of the radiant-browed daughters of the great nineteenth century,” as Dr. Müller-Lyer calls her, in one of the many touches of eloquence which quicken without injuring the movement of his lucid prose.

J. M. ROBERTSON.

THE PROBLEM OF RACE.

DER RASSENKAMPF: SOZIOLOGISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN. Von Ludwig Gumplowicz. Zweite, durchgesehene und mit Anhang, enthaltend die 1875 erschienene Schrift "Rasse und Staat" versehene Auflage. Innsbruck, 1909.

THE appearance of a second edition of the late Professor Gumplowicz's "Race-Struggle," twenty-six years after the first, with a reproduction of his still earlier essay on "Race and State," is an interesting episode. Evidently the book has not *fait école*, though its author claims that "race-knowledge and race-research to-day constitute an objective science." None the less, even its opponents will admit the *Rassenkampf* to have been a stimulating and suggestive book, well worth reprinting for the now much multiplied class of sociological students. Less than justice is done to its variety of interest by general surveys which set forth only its central thesis or theses. The bare propositions that mankind has descended not merely from an animal species but from quasi-human species evolved in different regions, and that the essence of history and of sociology consists in their perpetual conflict, are not likely to win the studious notice of readers of younger generation. It is the wide-ranging discussion surrounding the exposition that gives to the treatise its interest and its intellectual value.

Beyond question, Professor Gumplowicz wrought forcibly for the scientific movement when he insisted that the history of man is natural history, and claimed to supersede alike the theistic and the so-called "nationalistic" (intellectualist) methods of historic survey by the naturalistic; and further when he pressed home one notion of the ubiquitous "struggle for existence" by presenting all history as a strife of groups, nations, races. Against Biblical presuppositions he availed for free science; and as against the unfruitful analogy-mongering of Schäffle and Lilienfeld, which he derided, he stood for observation and induction. But since the second edition stands in the main at the positions of the first, there is nothing for it but to avow that the effort of resistance overbalances the new construction. As against the darkening theological concept of "free-will," Gumplowicz must needs affirm that will is "unfree," failing like so many professed determinists to see that the two terms are alike irrelevant to the actuality. And on the primary verbal confusion there has been built a dogma, to the effect that individual variation counts for nothing.

This, like all the subsidiary propositions of the book, is needlessly in excess of the real requirements of its author's conception of sociology. It was not necessary to affirm "un-freedom" in order to put down the chimera of "free-will." It was equally unnecessary to assume and insist that the human species must have been independently evolved in many different parts of the planet. Variation and strife would arise in a species determined by the conditions of one zone or area: they are present in every litter of puppies. All this portion of the treatise tells of much time spent on unessentials without any thorough analysis of the problem; and the unmodified reproduction of it all, down to Kosb's arguments for any number of independent evolutions of man, seems to tell of failure to follow later discussion. Neither as to biology nor as to psychology does Dr. Gumplowicz appear to have revised his way of thinking. Dr. Lester Ward's argument for geographical unity of human evolution he meets by a mere

literary affirmation of the "creative force of Nature." He is still arguing with Agassiz against Darwin, and he is still at the stage of arguing that multiplicity of dialects proves diversity of racial origin, though all students of linguistics are now aware that any given speech or dialect needs only a disruption of its speakers into sundered groups in order to yield endless changes of form.

In his criticism of Buckle we have the same overstrain of statement. Like so many of Buckle's critics, he ascribes to that "path-breaker," whose important services he admits, the doctrine that race-character and race evolution depend always and everywhere on the repressive or evocative influence of the physical environment, and in particular on quality of food; when in point of fact Buckle took a purely economic view of nutrition, and devoted much of his most strenuous exposition to showing the injurious effects of wrong ideas, beliefs, and political methods. And, while partly recognising the extravagance of Gobineau's denial that local conditions have any influence on social or individual development, Gumpłowicz can see nothing but error in Buckle's thesis that the rapid efflorescence of Arab civilisation in Spain, Persia, and India proves the evocative power of the environment. For him, the efflorescence was wholly due to the previous civilisations with which the Arabs came in contact. He never asks whether these civilisations in turn were not determined by their environment, or whether the Arab efflorescence could independently have taken place in the original Arab milieu. By this time, one would think, it should be easy to recognise all the factors—pre-potency of environment as determining alike physiological and social variation; pre-potency of those variations, in turn, in the case of races transferred to environments in themselves unfavourable to primary progress; and the varying reaction of prior civilisations upon new entrants.

The true view might seem to be implicit in Gumpłowicz's insistence upon the "unity" of the phenomena and rejection of Buckle's "dualism." But that thesis is imposed as a negation where it is merely a summing-up. When the deniers of the influence of local conditions point to the stagnation of the Turks "under Grecian skies," and posit instead the sole factor of "race," they are obviously confuted by the stagnation of the later Greeks under the same skies. Evidently the later determinants in both cases are to be sought for in the social processus. But, in both stages alike, the "unity" is intelligible in terms only of the statement of the variations of the equation. Greek civilisation rises under given conditions of (a) site, (b) culture-contacts, and (c) socio-political adjustments; alterations in c cancel the effects of a and b. The tracing of these interactions is in fact the task of sociology. Merely to insist on the "unity" of the process is to refuse to trace causation, the "how" of the process. The concept of "unity" here is merely the statement of the result—a category of sociological ignorance, on all fours with the theistic formula, "God so willed it": so-called "dualism" in sociology is simply analysis; and without analysis there is no science.

Of the exposition of Gumpłowicz the defect is not so much the refusal to analyse as the narrowing of the field to the single phenomenon of race strife and its political results, a process in which the need for analysis is hardly felt. You posit an endless strife of races; and it goes without saying that it is the stronger that wins. It is surprising that after all the work of the past twenty-five years this should still seem to anyone the upshot of sociology. The process or factor in which Gumpłowicz sees the summary of all history might be described, in comparison with the vast and

intricate processes of building-up of arts and industries and societies, as the mere chronic destruction or redistribution of the results of these. Its constructive aspect is merely a specific but terminable political differentiation of men and classes.

In an interesting note (pp. 196-8) descriptive of a discussion with his friend Ludwig Woltmann, Gumpłowicz tells how he abandoned his original purely anthropological conception of "race," set forth in his "Race and State," for a sociological one, in which class differences are seen to work as racial. This was a step forward which Woltmann declined to take; and it must stand to the credit of Gumpłowicz, who seems to have been led to it by his personal observation of the society in which he found himself. He is further to be credited with superiority to the racial pride or prejudice which seem to underlie so many German and other statements of the "race" doctrine, and which is associated with so much deplorable political rhodomontade everywhere. But the reduction of "race-struggle" to mere "class-struggle" only shortens the road to the conclusion that the conception is a false centrum for a system of sociology. It might perhaps be profitably relegated to a sub-division of "politology." In any case, it cannot bear the weight Professor Gumpłowicz laid upon it; and in reproducing it as he has done he incurs the verdict "out of date."

J. M. ROBERTSON.

STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By William McDougall. Methuen & Co., London.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Edward Alsworth Ross. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1908.

THE chief characteristic that these two books have in common is the title, the use of which seems to be equally inappropriate. Mr. McDougall's psychology, always valuable in itself, may be described as anything except social, while Professor Ross's sociology, compendious as to facts and clever in statement, is almost wholly lacking in psychology. The reader might therefore hope to make an adequate treatise by combining the books, but he will soon find that they decline to fuse. Mr. McDougall makes clear the fact that his work is an introduction to social psychology; the occasion for full consideration will therefore come later. At present one suspects that the porch, ably constructed as it is, is so much more important than the temple that the latter must remain in the end only the diminutive appendage. Mr. McDougall's introduction is in reality an introduction to ethics, which very few sociologists would consider identical with their science; his inquiry is, as he says, into the springs of conduct, these being found quite rightly in the instincts and emotions. These are undoubtedly matters that must enter into the science of man, but very few would consider, for example, a treatise on the geology of coal as an introduction to modern industrial history. So, a social psychology, while concerned of necessity with the instincts and emotions as material, must direct its main inquiry to the reason why these show a particular configuration or pattern. If the problem is likened to that of pottery, it is the evolution of shapes and decorative form rather than that of clay that is the chief object of interest. Mr. McDougall indicates in the end how he means to attach his temple to his porch when he says: "All that constitutes culture and civilisation, all, or nearly all, that

distinguishes the highly cultured European intellectually and morally from the men of the stone age of Europe, is then summed up in the word 'tradition,' and all tradition exists only in virtue of imitation, for it is only by imitation that each generation takes up and makes its own the tradition of the preceding generation; and it is only by imitation that any improvement, conceived by any mind endowed with that rarest of all things, a spark of originality, can become embodied within the tradition of his society." His social psychology promises to be like that of Tarde and Baldwin, and indeed of Professor Ross, one in which the main problems are obscured and the rest distorted by the doctrine of imitation. One other point, if one may venture to criticise Mr. McDougall's mode of expression, is to suggest that lucidity is not incompatible with absence of prolixity. The hope of being understood by the non-technical public, a great snare and delusion, has induced Mr. McDougall to allow his style to fall at times into a wearisome pedestrianism.

Professor Ross's work is clever, interesting, very American and filled with striking illustrations; if, however, social psychology hopes to survive it must enter upon the struggle for existence as an articulated animal and decline to be born until it is free from jelly-fish characteristics. The difficulty is that Professor Ross, with all his great abilities, has allowed his scientific vision to be obscured by the doctrine of imitation. His individual variant is the distinction between conventionality imitation and custom imitation, imitation of the new and imitation of the old. These terms, with others derived from the work of Le Bon, such as "The Crowd," "Mob Mind," and from Tarde as "Conflict" and "Union," provide the compartments into which Professor Ross has crammed his observations. In the first chapter Professor Ross limits his inquiry by excluding all the psychology; he says: "Social psychology, as the writer conceives it, studies the psychic planes and currents that come into existence among men in consequence of their association." He excludes from this all psychic planes or currents produced by a common environment or experience, the psychology of groups and characteristics of race, leaving only those which are due to "mental contacts or mental interactions," "the influences they have received from one another or from a common unit source." "It is social only in so far as it rises out of the interplay of minds." With these limitations the inquiry becomes for the psychologist a highly technical and non-social one into the mechanism of suggestion, a subject which occupies the next chapter and shows no knowledge of recent inquiries in this important department.

Altogether the outlook in social psychology does not inspire optimism. It might perhaps do well to go into a state of suspended animation for a few years until a greater number of exact special investigations are available for its use.

J. W. S.

LIFE IN AN ENGLISH VILLAGE. By Maude F. Davies. Fisher Unwin, 12/6 net.

It is not too much to say that this book provides a landmark in the progress of the science of Sociological Survey. The village described is Corsley in Wiltshire; the author is a lady resident in the parish, who has also been a student of the London School of Economics. She has succeeded in presenting the economic and social conditions of life in Corsley with a fulness and

accuracy which could not possibly be attained in an urban survey, which is remarkable even in the much more favourable circumstances of her task. But the eminent and striking feature of her achievement is that she supplies the geographical and historical background without which interpretation is impossible.

The central feature of the parish is Cley Hill, an ancient British fort, one of the line of hill strongholds along the watershed of the English and British Channels, of which Cadbury Castle (Camelot, according to Leland) is perhaps the most notable. Whether as the result of the persistence of Cymric influence or not, Corsley did not grow into a consolidated village of the ordinary Wiltshire type, but became a group of nine hamlets, forming parts of several different manors. This fact, Miss Davies shows, has influenced all its economic history and present condition. It was probably a determining factor in the establishment of the woollen industry, which played an immensely important part in its life in the 17th and 18th centuries; and has much to do with the comparative abundance of small holders and market gardeners in the parish. The permanent results of the coming and passing of the manufacturing era in Corsley's history, of the fluctuations of national architecture, of religious movements, are equally clearly set out; and throughout the influence of the geographical conditions of surface, soil and position, are duly noted.

A chapter on the working of the old Poor Law is particularly interesting at this time as it tells of the actual attempts of the parish to deal with its poor. The case of the parish providing two aged men with a donkey and cart with which they could earn a subsistence supplies an instance of the elasticity of parochial administration before 1834.

The author's compilations of statistics and facts of the present day cover the whole field of the social and individual life of the village and its inhabitants. Some of her observations will tend to disillusionise urban readers. She writes, "Looking to find poverty, it was no small surprise to discover that the majority of people were in quite affluent circumstances." And then goes on to give the reasons for this condition of things, the most striking and regrettable one being that of the absence of children, and the number of childless labourer-farmers.

Perhaps the most remarkable fact that stands out in the whole book is that of the high average of births, and very small proportion of deaths, of children in the families of market-gardeners, only one tenth as many die in these as there are die in the families of labourers. The number of births among farmers is small but the number surviving is large, and among the labourers there is a slight increase of births and a large increase of deaths.

Out of 15 groups of occupations, in 13 groups more children have migrated from the village than remain in the families. Out of 456 children over school age, born of parents in the parish, only 200 are now resident there, 256 having migrated. Here are facts and figures valuable both to the propagators of the "Back to the Land" movement, and to those students wishing to make a scientific study of the past and present conditions of our rural life. Perhaps the author's figures on Housing are not so clear as they might be, yet any one who understands the feeling of reserve retained by our villagers will recognise that it would be difficult to improve them. It is surmised, as so often happens, that although taking the aggregate number of rooms and the aggregate number of population there is sufficient

room space, yet the houses and the families are badly matched, and overcrowding is frequent.

Altogether this book represents probably the most honest and painstaking endeavour that has been made to get a real knowledge of life in an English village. Miss Davies has set an example to be emulated. A few more surveys of villages of other types, executed with equal care and insight, added to this, would furnish a diagnosis of the rural condition of England of inestimable value.

GILBERT SLATER.

LUXURY AND THE WASTE OF LIFE. By E. J. Urwick. Dent.

PROFESSOR URWICK'S book suffers little from this tardy appreciation, for his subject and his treatment are of enduring interest. In addressing himself to the average member of the educated classes he seeks, by a blend of informal ethical and economic analysis, to reach a clear conception of the part played by luxurious expenditure in the social system. In order to make his treatment 'practical' he takes the following provisional definition of luxury: "All consumption of goods and use of services, or all satisfaction of wants, which involves an expenditure normally incompatible with life upon an income of £200 per family per annum, this being the average income of the whole population of England at the present time."

Thus luxury is brought into direct and proportionate relation to inequality of distribution, the assumption being that, as the normal economic needs of families are approximately the same, any considerable departure from this norm in the excessive expenditure of some families involves a corresponding deficiency in the expenditure of others and therefore a net waste from the standpoint of society. This treatment, of course, makes 'luxury' largely a question of degree, the highest intensity attaching to the topmost portions of the largest incomes, the lowest to the layers of expenditure just above £200. However, Mr. Urwick is careful not to give too rigid or mechanical an interpretation to his formula, and occupies himself mostly in a sympathetic and deeply suggestive study of the social ethics of his subject.

Luxury inflicts a double injury upon society, involving on the one hand a dearth of reasonable or even necessary satisfaction among those who suffer deprivation from the diversion of industrial power from useful to useless forms of 'wealth,' and on the other an injury of repletion and of enervation among those who live a life of luxury. Expressed in vital terms "it uses up a portion of life which might be better used in satisfying others whose needs are greater." In regarding the effect of luxury upon individual character, no final test of general application, of course, is possible. "The deserts of each, the requirements of each individual's efficiency, the differences of customary position, and the differences of capacity to use and to enjoy, must all be taken into account." This would seem to suggest another definition of luxury which should identify it with such consumption as does not contribute to the personal and social efficiency of the consumer.

Mr. Urwick discusses in a very profitable way the practical difficulties which press upon the well-to-do reformer who recognises the injury he may do himself and others by a bad use of his money. Having pierced the sophistry which represents luxurious expenditure as good for trade, he cannot spend it on himself. To save it, and so add to his income, only

postpones and enhances his problem. Charity of the ordinary kind is full of pitfalls. Even if he gives it to the State or some other public authority, it may go in saving rents and taxes, setting free the incomes of others for more luxurious expenditure. If he cannot trust the State to make a wise and economical use of it, he may, however, administer his wealth himself for the common weal, selecting such modes of public benefit as seem to him most expedient.

If Professor Urwick raises more questions than he can answer, and if his argument does not carry us to precise conclusions, these defects are inherent in the subject-matter. There is no way of dealing effectively with superfluous incomes excepting to render them impossible.

J. A. H.

L'ORGANISATION SYNDICALE DES CHEFS D'INDUSTRIE ; ETUDE SUR LES SYNDICATS INDUSTRIELS EN BELGIQUE. By Professor G. de Leener. 2 vols. Bruxelles: Misch & Thron.

THE popular notion of the function and value of industrial combines is still so hazy, and the legislative efforts to fit them into the industrial order of a modern state are so various and disconnected, that every serious contribution to their study must be welcome. Professor de Leener's book is especially valuable for more than one reason. In the first place Belgium is a country which lends itself to exhaustive study. Though only twice the size of Yorkshire, and with a population under eight millions, almost all the leading industries of Western Europe are represented within its boundaries; and it is possible to isolate and investigate its various industrial factors in a way that is almost impracticable where larger countries are under consideration. Prof. de Leener's essay is based on a very sound foundation of facts. He gives, in the first volume, a record of all but the most insignificant manufacturers' agreements, combines and trusts, a record full of rich material for the elucidation of general principles. We see how the survival of home industries, so characteristic of Belgium, stands in the way of effective organisation, not only on the part of the workers, but of the employers as well; how again the excessive individualism of the small employer prevents him from using the only effective weapon of combating the larger financial resources of the limited liability company, namely, combination with his colleagues. We also see how the larger concerns and the combines are themselves threatened by new, sometimes international, agreements or trusts.

The author's theoretical work is no less valuable. Beginning with an exposure of the fallacy that the struggle between individuals is the normal basis of commerce and industrial enterprise, he shows the actual needs from which each form of combination arose and from which it received its inherent strength or weakness. Too many of the Belgian combines show an instability which is also typical of the trade-union movement of that country. Concerted action is taken at a time of crisis, but the agreement becomes a dead letter when the immediate object has been gained. Yet the general trend is towards greater permanency, and there is a growing solidarity of interests in the different industrial groups. This interference with the law of competition, as it is understood by many economists of the older schools, is deeply resented by certain politicians, in Belgium as elsewhere; and the schemes proposed for stemming the threatening tide of

trusts are as varied as they are numerous. A study of the means adopted or suggested in various countries to counteract the danger of monopoly inherent in every trust formation is of no small socio-psychological interest. Sometimes the tariffs are used to check the rise of prices beyond a maximum arbitrarily fixed by the state; in other cases the charges on the national railways are so used as to neutralize dumping operations. Sometimes the state, by extending the industrial enterprise under its direct régime—as in the case of Prussia's state-management of potash mines—becomes a dominating partner in the combine and is thus enabled to control price and output in the interest of national prosperity. State intervention in matters of finance—especially through the credit given by national or subsidised banks—offers another possibility of influencing the operation of the trusts. On the whole, the author seems to incline to the belief that these factors, adapted to the circumstances, are more capable of safeguarding the public interest than mere legislative restrictions. The consumer, no doubt, will always look askance upon the formation of monopolies which threaten to raise prices. But his hope does not lie so much in any prohibition or restriction of these as in the equilibrium which will be brought about by the operation of opposing combines, equally strong and unfettered. As the author says: "There is less mutual opposition between the forgemasters of the whole of Europe than there is between the forgemasters and coke producers in one and the same country." He argues that the industrial order of the future will take its character from this inevitable clash of interests and not from the accidental boundaries of states. The danger of corruption, so manifest wherever a particular set of interests has been allowed to outgrow all others in strength and solidity, can to a certain extent be met by laws demanding a greater publicity of proceedings. The rather doleful experience of the past in this respect should not, however, blind our eyes to the wonders which industrial combination has already achieved and those which, under wise legislative regulations, it is capable of performing in the future.

THE TRUST MOVEMENT IN BRITISH INDUSTRY. By H. W. Macrosty. Longmans & Co.

DESPITE other writings on Trusts and monopolies, this volume occupies and will probably occupy for some time an important place in economic literature. It gives a consecutive and impartial account of the gradual development of the system of Amalgamations and Trusts in the various industries of the country; and it is from such an account far more than from vague assertions and generalisations that the student can realise the magnitude of the movement. The task indeed undertaken by Mr. Macrosty was not an easy one and his success is the more remarkable. It required considerable judgment and discrimination to build up the narrative here presented to the reader, from widely separated and often uncertain sources. But the author has continued his search through one branch of industry after another and as a result we have a concrete description of this particular development. While the various chapters, dealing as they do with different industries, are all interesting; some are distinctly better both in form and conclusions than others. Thus those on the Extractive Industries and Grain-Milling are particularly valuable. On the other

hand the treatment of monopolies and amalgamations in the various branches of transport is disappointing. To some extent the difference here noted may be due to differences in the material. The system for instance of Shipping Conferences was till recently very inaccurately known, so far as extent and detail are concerned. But probably some of the deficiencies evident are due to the limits imposed upon himself by the author. Though fully conscious that a movement of this nature is due to certain general causes and conditions, Mr. Macrosty has refrained from an analysis of these. The result has proved unfortunate; since after all even a realistic study like the present ought to indicate the reasons which lead to greater success in the Trust movement in some directions than in others. Again there is not sufficient discrimination between unions and amalgamations mainly effected in view of the advantages arising from the conduct of business on a large scale and those devised to secure the particular benefits of monopoly. Of course the author recognises the distinction; but he does not employ it to much purpose. Trusts, indeed, should be treated as amalgamations for the latter purpose, and therefore in their examination certain tests of detriment or success need to be applied. How far, for instance, does their actual history justify the claim that waste is avoided and general advantage rendered possible by a greater stability in the relations introduced between supply and demand? This is but one of the questions to be considered. Its answer, as indeed the answers to many other questions, must be sought in the fortunes of various enterprises.

Possibly, however, questions like these must be taken as not within the scope of a volume so brief as the present. Their exclusion, however, detracts in some measure from the value of the narrative as a narrative. But while we must regret this we must congratulate the author on the very useful service he has performed. He has depicted with great impartiality and yet in a very interesting manner, a movement which has attained very grave dimensions during the last quarter of a century. The Trust Problem is one destined to have grave social and political consequences.

E. C. K. G.

DARWINISM AND NATURAL SCIENCE. By F. W. Headley, F.Z.S. Methuen, 5/- net.

To criticise society as it is in the present, and as it has been in past ages, from the point of view of the Darwinian theory of progress through natural selection, and to discuss Socialist proposals for the amelioration of society, from the same point of view, is the task Mr. Headley has set himself. It is one that demands great talents, conscientious thoroughness in research and wide knowledge. Mr. Headley enters upon his task with a breezy confidence in his own powers that enables him to produce matter that might have figured respectably in the columns which the "Daily Express" recently devoted to anti-Socialism. He ranges over the forms of association to be found among animals, the evolution of the family of Indian, Russian and English Village Communities, and the whole industrial history of Great Britain in 120 short pages. In some chapters he shows signs of having read one or two of the best known text-books on the subject treated, in others such evidence is lacking. In a still smaller space he disposes of the subjects

of Factory Legislation, the origin, history and functions of Trade Unions, Municipal enterprise, Railway finance, Trusts, the Land Question, etc., etc. Occasionally his remarks are shrewd, though seldom related to any conceivable central argument.

When finally he comes to Socialism he displays a blank and cheerful ignorance of the views of English Socialists. He attempts to explain "The Theoretical Basis of Socialism," and presents a curious travesty of Karl Marx's labour-cost theory of value.

If he is to be pardoned for not knowing that the English Socialist who believes in Karl Marx's theory of value is a very rare bird, it was at least incumbent in him to make some effort to state that theory accurately. His explanation of Socialism as a political system is knocked off with equal light heartedness. "Under the proposed socialist régime the State is to be everything—the universal employer, the universal educator, the universal regulator, and, as anyone who has not caught the fever of Socialism must feel, the universal muddler, meddler and tormenter."

If Mr. Headley had acutely discussed even this scarecrow conception of Socialism from the Darwinian point of view he might have produced some valuable work. Strange to say, his only contribution to the discussion is a stray remark, apropos of something else, that Socialism would give a clear field to sexual selection, the thwarting of which under economic pressure is "one of the weakest points of our present civilisation." He says: "It is evident that the socialist theory if fully carried out would cure this disease of the social organism. . . . But may we be saved from such remedies and the new evils they would bring with them."

When Mr. Headley is on purely biological ground his conclusions are crudely conceived and crudely expressed. Thus (p. 129) he declares that "sound teeth have survival value no longer," and apparently attributes the extraordinary deterioration of teeth within the period of one generation to this alleged fact. He declares that "alcohol does much to keep up the physical vigour of the race," apparently because a strong man can survive alcoholic excess which would kill a weak man, without making the slightest reference to the researches which tend to prove that the evil effects of alcoholism are hereditary. His terrible threats of a national decline in vigour if society should be so ill advised as to dispense with tuberculosis, leave us unmoved.

It is greatly to be hoped that some abler and better informed writer will take up Mr. Headley's subject.

G. S.

EVOLUTION IN ITALIAN ART. By Grant Allen. With sixty-five reproductions from photographs. London: Grant Richards, 1908. 10/6 net.

GRANT ALLEN'S versatile genius has made contributions to almost every branch of the science of man from biology up. The present work, consisting of republished papers, has a dual relation to the author's other inquiries, that of his "Physiological Aesthetics," published in 1877 and that of his general point of view and method as a naturalist. He treats Italian painting as having the same kind of continuity and as being influenced by conditions in the same manner as an organism. His central

theme is the evolution of composition from early simple expressiveness to the elaborate and somewhat artificial treatment of figures in the sixteenth century. Associated with this development of design is the succession of influences, mostly of a social character, by which it is determined. The book is a welcome addition to the history of painting; indeed, without something of its point of view painting can hardly be said to have had a history. There is no risk now that the limitations of the naturalist's method will fail to discover themselves.

J. W. S.

CORRIGENDA.

By an unfortunate oversight the review by Professor Caldecott in the last number, under the title of "Phases of Philosophical Development," went to press without being corrected. The following errata should be noted :—

- P. 79, line 7, for *put by* read *that of*.
2nd par., line 5, for *inferations* read *operations*.
last line but one, for *i.e.* read *lie*.
- P. 80, 1st par., last line but one, after *each* insert *sphere*.
2nd par. line 8, for *in* read *of*.
- P. 81, 2nd par., after *think* delete *but*.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS. Vol. xxiv, No. 2.—In an article on yeoman farming in Oxfordshire from the 16th century to the 19th, Mr. H. L. Gray re-examines, with the help of the land tax returns, the current theories as to the decline of the English yeomanry and the effect of the enclosure policy. His main conclusions are that the marked decline in yeoman farming took place between the 16th century and 1760 rather than after that date, that enclosure of the open fields after 1760 was not disastrous to occupying owners who had more than one acre of land, and that earlier enclosures should probably be looked upon as, in the main, not a cause but a result of the disappearance of small farms.—Two articles on the English Budget of 1909 afford further evidence of the eagerness with which modern theories of taxation are being discussed.

ECONOMIC JOURNAL. Vol. xx, No. 77.—The most interesting contribution is Mr. R. H. Gretton's article on lot meadow customs at Yarnton—curiously enough, a study of rural conditions in the county with which Mr. H. L. Gray is concerned in the *American Journal*. It furnishes an excellent description of the working of the strip system in the Yarnton water meadows under conditions which governed it before Domesday was written.—Mr. J. S. Furnivall, discussing the organisation of consumption, deals briefly with that increasingly serious question the rise of prices throughout India.—Ruth Young—*The true cost of secondary education for girls*.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. Vol. xx, No. 2.—Professor J. H. Muirhead considers the ethical aspect of the New Theology, which, he says, comes as the reassertion of a truth that no religion can be without, the awakening of religious thought to the truth that the universe is one, the Infinite here or nowhere. What is matter of surprise is, not that the new thought should have made itself in these days clearly and powerfully felt, but that it should have been so long in doing so. The way is closed to any mere reassertion of the old doctrines of transcendence. The same deep underlying convictions that lead men to reject a doctrine of pure immanence lead them also to reject a merely super-eminent God. Professor Muirhead discusses the New Theology view of sin and responsibility. Both the problem and its solution are as old as Plato, who had no sooner recognised the transcendence of the idea than he perceived that no real significance could attach to it unless it were seen to be immanent in things. It was the same belief which Dante held to be the quintessence of Christianity.—Mr. T. Veblen has a suggestive article on Christian morals and the competitive system. "It is a notable fact that, as a general rule, in its subsequent diffusion to regions and peoples not benefited by the Roman discipline, Christianity spread in proportion to the more or less protracted experience of defeat and helpless submission undergone by these peoples; and that it was the subject populace rather than the master classes that took kindly to the doctrine of non-resistance."—J. H. Tufts—*The present task of ethical theory*; W. R. Sorley—*The philosophical attitude*; Thomas Jones—*Pauperism: facts and theories*.

YALE REVIEW. Vol. xviii, No. 4.—This number is almost entirely given up to

fiscal questions. The British Budget of 1909 is made the subject of editorial comment and of an article by George L. Fox. Other articles deal with taxation in America and France.

THE MONIST. Vol. xx, No. 1.—Dr. Paul Carus—*The nature of logical and mathematical thought.* H. Poincaré—*The future of mathematics.* Bernhard Pick—*The Personality of Jesus in the Talmud.*

RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA. Fasc. v-vi.

Il Consiglio Direttivo: Cesare Lombroso.

E. Ferri: Cesare Lombroso e la funzione sociale della scienza. In his scientific work Lombroso exemplified the social function of science, which especially characterized nineteenth century thought. In his method he was a spiritual descendant of Galileo; he was a philosopher inasmuch as he attacked the problem of the origin of evil. He modified the social conscience of his age, and preached an idealism which had its roots in life and reality.

R. De La Grasserie: La Terra e la Vita Sociale. The influence of the geographical factors on social phenomena—politics, religion, economic conditions, language, etc. With advancing civilization the social factor tends to predominate through commerce and colonization; further, there are conflicts between the two factors: in Switzerland geographical unity absorbs social differences; in Austria and Turkey a variety of social elements creates disunion.

B. Labanca: L'Italia e la Chiesa di Roma attraverso i secoli. F. Ercole: Sulla origini del regime comunista nel matrimonio. A necessity to investigate the complex social and legal circumstances which determined the appearance of this institution in the Middle Ages—an institution unknown in Roman law. Too much stress is laid on the influence of Germanic law. Community of goods found in Istria, Sicily and Sardinia where such influence was small.

G. Crescimanno Vilardita: Dell'esistenza e del contenuto della Scienza politica. The human activity which manifests itself in the relation of various groups with the State forms the subject matter of the science; it cannot be cut off from the psychology of the State. State action is not arbitrary, but it dependent on an organic constitution, resulting from the action and reaction of the groups.

A. Martinazzoli: Per la prevenzione della criminalità giovanile. Juvenile crime forms a chapter in the general pathology of the moral sense. Lombroso formulated the theory of innate delinquency, but the psychology and environment of the delinquent need special study. Classification is urgent, both to obviate mental contagion and for educational ends.

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DE SCIENZE SOCIALI E DISCIPLINE AUSILIARIE.

Fasc. cciv: G. Tuccimei. Tra Darwin e De Vries. The theory of natural selection has been found insufficient to explain the formation of new species. We must unhesitatingly confess that the origin of species is an unsolved problem. If we conclude from De Vries' experiments that mutation produces races and variety, it is not demonstrable that such would be the result under natural conditions.—Mario Augusto Martini: La Mezzadria in Toscana. A lecture given in Florence during the "Settimana Sociale" in September, 1909, on the Metayer system, its economic and juristic form, the modifications needed to make it a factor in agricultural progress, its effect on the reward of labour, etc.—Paolo Emilio De Luca: Problemi attuali di emigrazione a proposito di recenti studi, proposte e discussioni alla Camera italiana. A marked increase in the attention given to these questions by publicists, politicians

and students. A brief summary is given of discussions as to the reaction of emigration on home life, condition of emigrants abroad, means for preserving connection with the Mother Country. In the Senate and Chamber of Deputies the need of regulation is almost universally admitted by the Speakers.

Fasc. ccv: Giulio Gennari. *Le Classe agricole e le loro organizzazioni sociali ed economiche nel Ferrarese*. The agrarian question in the Ferrarese has been treated too exclusively from an economic standpoint. The writer deals with the political and social atmosphere of a district, in which crises have been violent and protracted.—Guiseppe Gorla: *La sintesi economica*. The account and criticism of a recent work of Loria, published under the above title.—Giacomo Vitali: *A proposito di un libro "Il Divino Artista di Luisa Anzoletti"*. The degeneracy of modern art due to lack of a real religious inspiration; we know precisely its psychological, physical and social qualities, but we cannot create beauty.

Fasc. ccvi: P. Aurelio Palmieri. *Le dottrine religiose di Duchobortzy*. This sect shows great enmity towards the official Church of Russia. The writer examines documents relating to their belief, and concludes that their doctrines are anti-religious and anti-social.—Emilio Federici: *Recrudescenze duellistiche*. Notice of a publication by an Austrian official—Gustavo Ristow, entitled "Ehrenkodex." The leading idea is that the defence of honour by the use of arms appertained to the status of a gentleman, but certain exceptions are made, which the writer of the article welcomes as furthering the cause of humanity. Allusion is made to the anti-duellistic attitude manifested by the International Congress at Buda Pesth.—Giulio Gennari: *Le Classe agricole e le loro organizzazioni sociali ed economiche nel Ferrarese*.—Eugenio Auzilotti: *Statistiche economiche e moderni problemi scientifici*. The importance of statistics in determining the sphere of large industry, the branches in which a small enterprise may still claim a certain superiority, etc. Researches conducted in Austria (1902) and in Switzerland (1905) indicate a great superiority of small businesses in all branches of industry and commerce, yet in certain directions a tendency to concentration, e.g., in mineral and textile enterprise, as against wood, leather, etc.

Also received:—

MAN: January, February, March, 1910.

THE OPEN COURT: January, February, March.

THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.
THE NEW SOUTH: January, 1910.

LE MUSÉE SOCIAL: Annales and Mémoires: January, February, March, 1910.
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE: December, 1909, and January, 1910. REVUE
DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE: January and March, 1910.

LA LECTURA: January, February, March, 1910.

ZENTRALBLATT FÜR ANTHROPOLOGIE: 1909, Heft 6: 1910, Heft 1. ARCHIV FÜR
RASSEN-UND GESELLSCHAFTS-BIOLOGIE: Heft 6, 1909, and Heft 1, 1910.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE, 1909,
Heft. 4. Paul Barth: DIE GESCHICHTE DER ERZIEHUNG IN SOZIOLOGISCHER
BELEUCHTUNG, xi.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- Fournière, Eugène. "La Sociocratie: Essai de Politique Pratique." Giard et Brière. 2.50 and 3 francs.
- Beaubois, Gabriel. "La Crise Postale et les Monopoles d'Etat." Giard et Brière. 2 francs.
- Worms, René. "Les Principes Biologiques de l'Evolution Sociale." Giard et Brière. 2 francs.
- Cavaillon, A. "Manuel Pratique des Lois Sociales." Giard et Brière. 2 francs.
- Fontalirant, William. "Etude Critique du Système Electoral Actuel." Giard et Brière. 1 franc.
- Maunier, René. "L'Origine et la Fonction Economique des Villes." Giard et Brière. 6 and 7 francs.
- Jones, Henry. "The Working Faith of the Social Reformer." Macmillan & Co. 7/6 net.
- De Leener, G. "L'Organisation Syndicale des Chefs d'industrie." Vol. I. Les Faits. Vol. II. La Théorie. Instituts Solvay. Misch & Thron.
- Wicksteed, Philip H. "The Common Sense of Political Economy." Macmillan. 14/- net.
- Peabody, Francis Greenwood. "The Approach to the Social Question." Macmillan & Co. 5/- net.
- Dunn, James. "From Coal-mine Upwards." London City Mission. 2/-.
- Berthod, Aimé. P. J. Proudhon et la Propriété. Un Socialism pour les paysans. Giard et Brière. 3 francs.
- Doczi, Dr. Samuel. "Les Expositions Borgnes, leurs Inconvénients et les Moyens de les combattre." Giard et Brière.
- Pearson, Karl. "Eugenics Laboratory Lecture Series V. The Problem of Practical Eugenics." Dulau & Co. 1/- net.
- Garnett, Richard. "The Life of W. J. Fox: Public Teacher and Social Reformer." John Lane. 16/- net.
- Archer, William. "Through Afro-America." Chapman & Hall. 10/6 net.
- Salt, H. S. (edited by). "Humanitarian Essays." New Series, Nos. I. and II. The Humanitarian League.
- Willis, W. A. "Housing and Town Planning in Great Britain." Butterworth & Co. 7/6.
- Dewe, Rev. J. A. "Psychology of Politics and History." Longmans & Co. 5/- net.

- Webb, Sidney and Beatrice. "English Poor Law Policy." Longmans & Co. 7/6 net.
- Swann, Alfred J. "Fighting the Slave Hunters in Central Africa." Seeley & Co., Ltd. 16/- net.
- Dyer, Henry. "Japan in World Politics." Blackie & Son. 12/6 net.
- Whetham, W. C. D. "Eugenics and Unemployment." Bowes and Bowes. 1/- net.
- d'Avenal, Le Vicomte G. "Le Mécanisme de la Vie moderne." Series 4 and 5. Librairie Armand Colin. 4-francs.
- Faguet, Emile. "Le Culte de l'Incompétence." Bernard Grasset. 2 francs.
- Cullen, Alexander. "Adventures in Socialism." A. & C. Black. 7/6 net.
- Parker, Edward Harper. "China and Religion." John Murray. 2/6 net.
- Loane, M. "Neighbours and Friends." Edward Arnold. 6/- net.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

THE METHODS OF EUGENICS.

On February 8 Dr. Saleeby delivered a lecture on "The Methods of Eugenica," Professor Caldecott presiding. Premising that Eugenica may be most briefly defined as the principle of selection for parenthood, and that for the sake of convenience the subject may be discussed as either Positive or Negative, the lecturer proceeded to examine certain suggested methods under both heads. Among methods of positive eugenics he noted as inadmissible the stud-farm or anything else that involved the destruction of marriage; he questioned the worth of bonuses for children, and approved reform of marriage by law and public opinion, measures preventive against racial poisons, and education for parenthood. Among negative methods he rejected the lethal chamber, the permission of infant mortality, the production of abortion at any stage, and mutilative surgery. He doubted the validity of marriage certificates; but accepted the sterilization and segregation of the unfit, sterilization being approved as the most humane measure where segregation was unnecessary. It was necessary to distinguish between marriage and parenthood. The lecturer urged as a primary essential the protection of parenthood from alcohol.

SOCIOLOGY AND THE ELECTIONS.

On February 22, Mr. J. A. Hobson read the paper on "The General Election: a Sociological Interpretation," which appears in this number. Sir Edward Brabrook presided.

THE ANNUAL MEETING.

The Annual Meeting of the Society was held in the hall of the Royal Society of Arts on March 8, Mr. S. H. Swinny presiding.

The Report for the year 1909, read by the Secretary, together with the income and expenditure accounts, were moved from the chair, and adopted *nem. con.*

It was intimated that of the members of the Council the following were not

seeking re-election :—Miss Collet, Mr. J. C. Hudson, Dr. C. S. Loch, Mr. David Mair, Mr. R. H. Tawney. The following were unanimously elected :—

Miss Mabel Atkinson.	Dr. F. W. Mott.
Mr. W. H. Beveridge.	Mr. H. O. Newland.
Dr. Bisschop.	Mr. J. Oliphant.
Rev. Professor Caldecott.	Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts.
Sir John A. Cockburn.	Dr. C. W. Saleeby.
Miss Findlay.	Mr. A. F. Shand.
Professor Geddes.	Dr. J. W. Slaughter.
Mr. G. P. Gooch.	Sir Richard Stapley.
Miss Sybella Gurney.	Mr. S. H. Swinny.
Dr. A. C. Haddon.	Mr. G. A. Touche.
Mr. P. H. Hartog.	Dr. J. Lionel Tayler.
Dr. A. J. Herbertson.	Sir C. Lewis Tupper.
Professor Hobhouse.	Professor E. J. Urwick.
Mr. J. A. Hobson.	Professor Westermarck.
Mr. George Montagu.	Sir Francis Younghusband.

Mr. J. Martin White was re-elected Honorary Treasurer, and Mr. Victor Branford Honorary Secretary.

Mr. Frederic Harrison, the retiring President, then delivered his Presidential Address, on "Sociology : its Definition and its Limits," which is published elsewhere in this number of the *Review*.

After some remarks by the Chairman, Professor Caldecott, on behalf of the Council, expressed the gratitude of the Society to the President for his services during the year. They recalled with pleasure that Mr. Harrison had taken an active part in the Society's work : he had filled the chair at meetings, had joined in discussions, and had contributed to the *Review*.

Brief speeches were made also by Professor Geddes, Mr. G. P. Gooch, and Sir Lewis Tupper.